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REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS
TO PROTECT TAXPAYER RIGHTS
LESLIE BOOK, T. KEITH FOGG & NINA E. OLSON*
Abstract
The tax system designed by Congress imposes significant administrative
burdens on taxpayers. IRS decisions regarding how it administers tax laws
can add to congressionally imposed burdens. The administrative burdens
are consequential and hurt some people, especially lower- or moderateincome individual taxpayers, more than others. While the IRS strives to
measure and reduce the time and money taxpayers spend to comply with
their tax obligations, it does not consider the effect administrative burdens
have on taxpayer rights, including the right to be informed, the right to pay
no more than the correct amount of tax, and the right to a fair and just tax
system. In this Article, we discuss the concept of administrative burdens
and reveal specific examples of how IRS actions—and inaction—have
burdened taxpayers and jeopardized taxpayer rights. In addition to
identifying and contextualizing these problems, we propose that the IRS
conduct Taxpayer Rights Impact Statements on new and existing systems to
evaluate when it would be appropriate to reduce, eliminate, or shift burdens
away from citizens and onto the government or third parties.
I. Introduction
Consider the following scenarios:
1. In response to a once-in-a-century pandemic, Congress turns to
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to deliver cash to
Americans who are suffering unprecedented hardships.
* Leslie Book is a Professor of Law at Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law. T. Keith Fogg is a Clinical Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and is the
founding Director of its low-income taxpayer clinic. Nina E. Olson is the former National
Taxpayer Advocate and current Executive Director of the Center for Taxpayer Rights. The
authors are grateful for the research assistance of Olivia Arasim and Anna Gooch. We
received helpful comments on earlier drafts from participants at the tax policy workshops at
Loyola Law School, University of Florida Levin College of Law, Stanford Law School,
Villanova Charles Widger School of Law, and the Tax Administration Research Centre at
the University of Exeter (UK). We are pleased to dedicate this Article to the memory of
Professor Jon Forman, whose commitment to justice, fair administration of the law, keen
intellect, and collegiality have inspired us and countless others.
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Congress structures the benefits as a refundable credit, known
as a Recovery Rebate Credit (“RRC”), that can be claimed on a
2020 tax return, but also directs the IRS to pay an equivalent
amount known as an economic impact payment (“EIP”). By
January 2021, the IRS issues over 300 million EIPs to eligible
individuals, totaling over $413 billion in emergency financial
relief. While most people receive money automatically, the IRS
lacks sufficient information on millions of Americans who did
not file tax returns. To distribute the full amount of EIPs, the IRS
establishes a non-filer portal for people to enter information for
themselves and their dependents. For many federal beneficiaries
who had not previously filed tax returns, the IRS provides under
two weeks to register to receive the full benefits relating to
dependents, thus preventing a Social Security disability recipient
from receiving assistance that was meant to help his family
during a crushing pandemic.
2. An IRS employee receives a phone call from an individual
working two part-time jobs at courier companies. The individual
has a tax liability and has received a certified notice that the IRS
intends to levy assets or garnish wages. The IRS has access to
databases showing a likelihood that the individual may be
experiencing financial hardship that would entitle the individual
to a delay in enforced collection, but the IRS employee does not
mention the possibility of delay, and the individual does not ask
for it. Instead, the IRS employee suggests a monthly payment
plan, and the individual enters into the agreement thinking that,
absent the agreement, the IRS will garnish her wages. The
monthly payments leave the individual unable to pay necessary
expenses for housing or healthcare.
3. An individual claims a refundable credit on her 2020 federal
income tax return that would have helped pay back due rent and
utilities, but the IRS applies the $1,800 refund to a 2012 federal
tax liability that stemmed from withdrawing $10,000 from a
retirement account when she first lost her job due to struggles
with opioid addiction.
In all these scenarios, individuals engaging in the various stages of tax
administration face a variety of barriers. The individual income tax system
in the United States is predicated on personal responsibility. From filing tax
returns to responding to requests for information or correspondence in an
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examination to avoiding enforced collection by demonstrating financial
hardship, individuals must affirmatively engage with the government. This
requires learning rules and communicating in some fashion with the IRS.
Individual income tax return filing is one such example. People with
income over a certain threshold have an obligation to file a tax return with
the IRS.1 On the U.S. federal income tax return itself, the taxpayer
identifies sources of income and prior payments and generally must claim
specific deductions or credits to compute a tax liability or to request a
refund or credit of any overpayment. While third parties like employers and
financial institutions are required to send year-end summary information
returns to taxpayers and to the government that identify wages,
withholdings, dividends, and interest,2 the government does not provide
taxpayers with a centralized portal through which taxpayers may readily
access that information to assist with their return-filing obligations. Instead,
individuals have an affirmative obligation to (1) collect the information, (2)
organize it, (3) determine whether they must file a tax return, and (4)
eventually calculate whether they owe additional money or are entitled to a
refund.
To be sure, individuals are not completely on their own. Some,
especially those with resources, can rely on third parties like commercial
tax return preparers. Others purchase software to avoid reading primary
source documents such as statutes, regulations, tax forms, or instructions.
But in all cases, the burden is on individuals to find and, in most cases, pay3
for help to calculate their liability or refund and meet their obligation to file
an annual individual income tax return.
It is not preordained that our tax system must default to placing burdens
on taxpayers. For example, other countries distribute the burdens of
individual tax return filing quite differently, with the burden generally
1. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A) (requiring filing when gross income exceeds the combined
amounts of the standard deduction and the personal exemption).
2. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.6051-1 (2021).
3. While most taxpayers must self-prepare, often by using computer programs for
which they pay or through hiring return preparation experts, some taxpayers use a system of
volunteer websites to obtain free return preparation. Getting into the full panoply of return
preparation options is beyond the scope of this Article, but the burden of tax preparation,
both in time and money, is without question. For a review of one free return preparation
program, see TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2016-40-045,
BETTER ADHERENCE TO PROCEDURES IS NEEDED TO ACCURATELY ASSESS THE VOLUNTEER
TAX RETURN PREPARATION PROGRAM (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/
2016reports/201640045fr.pdf.
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falling on the government.4 In pay-as-you-earn systems, such as those in the
United Kingdom and Japan, the government calculates withholdings to
match the amount of annual tax liabilities, resulting in many individuals not
having to file tax returns.5 Other countries, like Estonia, take the
information from third parties and provide pre-populated returns that
taxpayers simply review and verify.6 If the information is correct, the
individual can confirm the accuracy of the return and, with little effort,
verify its status with the tax administrator.
In the United States, individuals themselves bear a heavy burden in their
interactions with the IRS.7 The burdens taxpayers face are not unique to
tax-return filing and can create challenges after a taxpayer submits a return
to the IRS.8 Consider situations when the IRS believes the taxpayer may
4. Scholars have suggested various measures to reduce taxpayer burden in the filing
process, including changes that would increase government involvement. See, e.g., AUSTAN
GOOLSBEE, BROOKINGS INST., DISCUSSION PAPER 2006-04, THE ‘SIMPLE RETURN’: REDUCING
AMERICA’S TAX BURDEN THROUGH RETURN-FREE FILING (July 2006), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200607goolsbee.pdf (proposing the government
prepare individuals’ returns); Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax
Filing, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 773, 773–74 (2008) (suggesting a variety of ways that policy makers
can improve interactions with the tax system); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly
Taxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509, 1509, 1540–42 (2017) (recommending, inter alia, that the
government prepare individuals’ returns to simplify tax filing). Professor Thomas largely
focuses her proposals on reducing burdens as a way to improve voluntary compliance. In
contrast, we believe policymakers should consider reducing burdens as a way to reduce the
distributional costs of the burdens as an objective separate, though not unrelated to, the
effect on future compliance.
5. 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, A CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS OF PAY-AS-YOU-EARN (PAYE) WITHHOLDING SYSTEMS AS A MECHANISM FOR
SIMPLIFYING AND IMPROVING U.S. TAX ADMINISTRATION (2018) [hereinafter A CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS], https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ARC18_Vol
ume2_01_PAYE.pdf (overviewing pay-as-you-earn systems around the world, with an
analysis of the feasibility and potential benefits of other systems if applied in the United
States).
6. See Louis Jacobson, Jeb Bush Says Estonians Can File Their Taxes in Five Minutes.
Really?, POLITIFACT (June 4, 2015), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2015/jun/04/jebbush/jeb-bush-says-estonians-can-file-their-taxes-five-/. To be sure, with pay-as-you-earn or
pre-populated return systems, the taxable unit is the individual rather than the household, the
latter being the case for the United States. That significantly complicates the task of using a
true pay-as-you-earn model in the United States. See A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS, supra note
5, at 7–8.
7. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Jacob Goldin, Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-up: Lessons from the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 72 TAX L. REV. 59, 60 (2018) (discussing informational
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have understated her liability on a tax return. If the taxpayer receives
automated correspondence from the IRS stating that she has omitted or
misreported an item of income subject to third-party reporting, the taxpayer
must affirmatively respond to the IRS to avoid an assessment based on the
third-party information.9 Similarly, if the IRS selects a taxpayer’s tax return
for audit, the taxpayer generally must provide information to the IRS to
justify positions taken on the tax return.10 The burdens continue if the
taxpayer faces an assessed liability. If the IRS assesses a tax liability
against a taxpayer and the taxpayer cannot convince the IRS that the
assessment is incorrect or that the taxpayer cannot immediately pay the tax
debt, the taxpayer must take steps to avoid facing the IRS’s considerable
administrative collection powers. The taxpayer generally must affirmatively
demonstrate that she does not owe the tax; that her financial condition
warrants either a delay in collection; or that she is entitled to an alternative
to enforced collection, such as an installment agreement or compromise of
the liability.11
In all these interactions with the IRS, taxpayers face a variety of burdens
in meeting their formal filing responsibilities, proving entitlement to a
refund, responding to IRS queries, or demonstrating entitlement to an
alternative to enforced collection. The costs of these barriers may even be
more consequential when Congress chooses to use tax administration to
deliver benefits, especially when the benefits are intended to provide relief
from an emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic.12 While noting that the
burdens the tax system imposes on taxpayers are not novel, we provide a
complexity in terms of an individual’s difficulty in obtaining informational inputs); Thomas,
supra note 4 (discussing procedural complexity concepts).
9. See generally Understanding Your IRS Notice or Letter, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
individuals/understanding-your-irs-notice-or-letter (Feb. 8, 2022).
10. For a discussion of the challenges that taxpayers, especially low-income taxpayers,
face when receiving correspondence during a correspondence-based examination, see W.
Edward Afield, Moving Tax Disputes Online Without Leaving Taxpayer Rights Behind, 74
TAX LAW. 1 (2020).
11. An assessment is the prerequisite to the IRS’s considerable collection powers. See
I.R.C. § 6203. For a discussion of the IRS’s collection powers, as well as taxpayer
opportunities to avoid enforced collection, see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, chs. 14A, 15 (2d ed., rev. 2022).
12. For a discussion of the inadequate federal safety net that exists to support Americans
in the COVID-19 pandemic, including the tax system, see Andrew Hammond et al., How the
COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape the American Safety Net, 105 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 154 (2020).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

532

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:527

framework for identifying these burdens. We also illustrate how these
burdens are consequential and hurt some people—especially lower- or
moderate-income individual taxpayers—more than others. While the IRS
strives to measure and reduce the time and money that taxpayers spend to
comply with their tax obligations,13 Congress and the IRS do not adequately
consider the distributional effect of these burdens or the effect these
burdens have on taxpayer rights, including “the right to be informed,” “the
right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax,” and “the right to a fair
and just tax system.”14
In this Article, we claim that the IRS and Congress should be more
sensitive to the impact that burdens have on certain classes of taxpayers and
on taxpayer rights. Building on the work of public administration scholars
13. For example, the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”), as originally enacted, was
intended to minimize the burdens associated with governmental agencies collecting
information from individuals and businesses. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521). It was first
reauthorized in 1986 and again reauthorized in 1995. See Paperwork Reduction
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, tit. VIII, §§ 801–812, 100 Stat. 3341-335,
3341-335 to 3341-336; Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat.
1063. To accomplish its purpose, the PRA “requires agencies to (1) justify, or describe the
necessity[] of[,] the information collected; (2) provide estimates of the burden they will
impose (i.e., the time and costs required to comply with the collection); and (3) publish
notices in the Federal Register and otherwise consult with the public to obtain input.” U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-381, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT: AGENCIES
COULD BETTER LEVERAGE REVIEW PROCESSES AND PUBLIC OUTREACH TO IMPROVE BURDEN
ESTIMATES 1 (2018) [hereinafter GAO, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT]. To ensure compliance
with the PRA, the IRS established the Office of Taxpayer Burden Reduction. See IRM
22.24.1 (Jan. 8, 2016). IRS Form 13285-A is used to report ways to reduce the burden.
About Taxpayer Burden Reduction, IRS (May 28, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/about-taxpayer-burden-reduction. We discuss the PRA
further at Section III.A.3.
14. See I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (listing taxpayer rights). The Taxpayer Bill of Rights was
officially codified as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act. See Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (codified as amended at
I.R.S. § 7803(a)(3)). Scholars have begun exploring the relationship between taxpayer rights
and tax administration. See generally Richard K. Greenstein, Rights, Remedies, and Justice:
The Paradox of Taxpayer Rights, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 743 (2019); T. Keith Fogg, Can the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights Assist Your Clients?, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 705 (2019) [hereinafter Fogg,
Can the TBOR Assist?]; Leslie Book, Giving Taxpayer Rights a Seat at the Table, 91 TEMP.
L. REV. 759 (2019) [hereinafter Book, Giving Taxpayer Rights a Seat]; Michelle Lyon
Drumbl, Tax Attorneys as Defenders of Taxpayer Rights, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 813 (2019);
Afield, supra note 10 (proposing better use of digital technology in a variety of post-filing
interactions with taxpayers as a way that affirms taxpayer rights).
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Pamela Herd and Don Moynihan, we more systematically identify
administrative burdens and their direct impact on the most vulnerable
taxpayers. It is a fairly noncontroversial claim that the IRS and Congress
should strive to reduce taxpayer burdens.15 While Congress places
responsibilities on the IRS for not only collecting revenues but also
distributing benefits in the form of credits for things like wage supplements,
childcare, housing, health care, and emergency cash assistance in the face
of an unprecedented health crisis, over the past decade the IRS budget has
declined by over twenty percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.16 The IRS is
struggling to adopt and implement technology, as well as to attract and
retain skilled employees.17 It is not enough to say that Congress and the IRS
should reduce burdens without more context. It is our goal in this Article to
provide that context. Policymakers need a template or framework to assist
them in identifying scenarios when administrative or legislative solutions
can reduce, eliminate, or shift the incidence of those burdens. Building on
15. As part of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”) Congress mandated that in writing
regulations, all government agencies must account for the burden of the regulations on small
businesses. See Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, Interactive Regulation, 13 U. PENN. J. BUS.
L. 837, 838 (2011). The RFA and its application to the IRS has begun to generate attention
among advocates and academics. See, e.g., Keith Fogg, How Does the Regulatory Flexibility
Act Impact Tax Regulations?, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 2, 2020), https://procedurally
taxing.com/how-does-the-regulatory-flexibility-act-impact-tax-regulations/. At least one court
has considered the RFA’s application to the IRS. Silver v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 19-CV247 (APM), 2019 WL 7168625, at *1–3 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019) (considering plaintiffs’ claim
that the IRS had failed to comply with the RFA and its mandate). Although the district court in
Silver determined that the plaintiffs survived the motion to dismiss, it ruled for the IRS at the
summary judgment stage, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit under the
RFA under these circumstances. See id. at *3; Silver v. Internal Revenue Serv., 531 F. Supp. 3d
346, 363–66 (D.D.C. 2021). We discuss the RFA further at Section III.A.2.
16. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2020 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 12 (2020)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2020], https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/ARC20_FullReport.pdf. To be sure, there has been a modest uptick in
funding in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mark Friedlich, Senate Joins House in
Passing Omnibus Spending Bill Providing Additional IRS Funding; “Extenders” and Other
Tax Provisions Not Included, WOLTERS KLUWER (Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.woltersklu
wer.com/en/expert-insights/senate-joins-house-in-passing-omnibus-spending-bill. For more
on IRS appropriations, see CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11323, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
APPROPRIATIONS, FY2020 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11323.
17. See Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, How the IRS Was Gutted, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 11,
2018, 5:00 AM EST), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-irs-was-gutted; see also
Leandra Lederman, The IRS, Politics, and Income Inequality, 150 TAX NOTES 1329 (2016)
(discussing IRS budget cuts).
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the insights of legal scholar Cass Sunstein, who refers to a subset of
administrative burdens as “sludge” when the burdens themselves are
excessive,18 we describe how the IRS and Congress should strive to reduce
excess administrative burdens in the tax system to help ensure that the tax
system operates consistently with principles embodied in the statutory
Taxpayer Bill of Rights.
When do burdens become excessive and trigger additional governmental
efforts to reduce, eliminate, outsource, or justify the burden? Our position is
they become excessive when two conditions are satisfied: first, when the
burdens fall primarily on a subset of taxpayers who are vulnerable,19
including individuals who are disabled,20 low income,21 or
underrepresented;22 and second, when the burdens directly impair taxpayer
18. Professor Sunstein distinguishes frictions and all administrative burdens from those
which constitute “sludge,” with sludge as a subset of those burdens that are in some way
excessive. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge Audits, BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y FIRSTVIEW, Jan. 6,
2020, at 7 [hereinafter Sunstein, Sludge Audits], https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2019.32.
Sunstein notes that the burdens that individuals experience when interacting with the
government or non-governmental actors can be “excessive, insufficient, or optimal.” See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SLUDGE: WHAT STOPS US FROM GETTING THINGS DONE AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 7 (2021) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, SLUDGE: WHAT STOPS US FROM GETTING THINGS
DONE].
19. We note that precise line-drawing around whether a group is vulnerable and
deserves additional protections can be difficult. See David E. Bernstein, The Modern
American Law of Race, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 171, 183–84, 187–209 (2021) (discussing the
predominant role agencies have played in determining how to define racial and ethnic
groups for data gathering, civil rights enforcement, and affirmative action purposes, and
noting how those agencies often have enacted arbitrary rules absent from meaningful public
engagement).
20. Tax scholars focusing on tax administration have not meaningfully engaged with
physical, mental health, intellectual, or cognitive disabilities. It is an area that deserves
additional attention. For a systematic study of substantive tax provisions of particular
significance to disabled taxpayers, see Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and
Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 PENN L. REV. 1053 (2006). For
a detailed discussion of one such provision, the “difficulty of care” income exclusion
applicable to payments for providing personal care services funded by Medicaid, see
Christine S. Speidel, Difficulty of Care: Aligning Tax and Health Care Policy for Family
Caregiving, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 503 (2021).
21. For the purposes of this Article, we define a low-income taxpayer as set forth in
Internal Revenue Code section 7526. See I.R.C. § 7526(b) (defining low income as income
equal to or less than 250% of federal poverty guidelines).
22. For the purposes of this Article, we define an underrepresented taxpayer as someone
who either (1) cannot afford representation due to his limited resources or (2) who can afford
representation, but the costs of representation are not justified in light of the amount of tax,
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rights. As to the first condition, we consider low-income taxpayers as part
of a protected group because this group’s characteristics (such as limited
literacy23) minimize the likelihood that the taxpayers themselves will be
able to overcome barriers on their own.24 We also consider
underrepresented taxpayers as worthy of additional procedural protections.
While there may be considerable overlap among the first two categories, if
the amount of potential tax, penalty, or interest does not justify the cost of
paying for the assistance of representatives, then an individual who could
afford representation would rationally choose to not incur those fees. That
person would be less likely to attain an outcome achievable in the absence
of the burdens.25
We note that our trigger for additional government efforts does not
overtly identify racial or ethnic groups despite a growing recognition that
agency interposition of burdens in an ostensibly race-neutral way may

penalties, or interest at issue. See generally I.R.C. § 7811(a)(2) (defining hardship, for
purposes of when it is justified to issue a Taxpayer Assistance Order, to include the incurring
of significant costs such as “fees for professional representation”).
23. See generally JONATHAN ROTHWELL, BARBARA BUSH FOUND. FOR FAM. LITERACY,
ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC GAINS OF ERADICATING ILLITERACY NATIONALLY AND
REGIONALLY IN THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (2020), https://www.barbarabush.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/09/BBFoundation_GainsFromEradicatingIlliteracy_9_8.pdf (controlling for
factors such as age, gender, and ethnicity, and finding a strong relationship between
disparities in income among people with varying levels of literacy).
24. Scholars are increasingly focusing on how vulnerable citizens, including low
income and underrepresented citizens, may struggle in the face of tax systems that
increasingly rely on automation. See, e.g., Sofia Ranchordás & Luisa Scarcella, Automated
Government for Vulnerable Citizens: Intermediating Rights, WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J.
(forthcoming) (focusing on how automation raises specific concerns for vulnerable citizens
with less access to internet or less facility to interact with technology); see also Joshua D.
Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Automated Legal Guidance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 179 (2020)
(exploring how automated legal guidance may exacerbate the gap in access to taxpayerfavorable legal advice, with low-income taxpayers bearing the costs of simplified online
interface).
25. The Tax Court reports that 75% of the petitioners filing in its court are
unrepresented. U.S. TAX CT., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FISCAL YEAR 2021, at
22 (2020), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/resources/budget_justification/FY_2021_Congress
ional_Budget_Justification.pdf. Not all of these pro se petitioners meet the definition of a
low-income taxpayer in I.R.C. § 7526, but most do, and the others who might have the
resources to hire professional help generally file pro se because the amount at issue does not
justify the cost of representation.
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contribute to exacerbating racial inequities.26 We believe that burdens that
fall disproportionately on traditionally disadvantaged racial or ethnic groups
contribute to perpetuating racial inequity and are worthy of additional
agency attention.27 At present, the IRS does not collect racial or ethnic
data.28 Following a Biden Administration executive order directing that all

26. See Victor Ray et al., Racialized Burdens: Applying Racialized Organization Theory
to the Administrative State, J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY (forthcoming), https://
academic.oup.com/jpart/advance-article-pdf/doi/10.1093/jopart/muac001/42956337/muac
001.pdf (exploring how agencies have used burdens to normalize and facilitate racially
disparate outcomes).
27. For a persuasive account as to how race and ethnicity may determine tax
enforcement outcomes, despite the IRS’s official position, see Jeremy Bearer-Friend,
Colorblind Tax Enforcement, 97 NYU L. REV. 101 (Apr. 2022). Determining which racial or
ethnic groups deserve additional procedural protections or which persons are part of a
particular group presents challenges that are outside the scope of this Article, though for a
starting point we recommend studying the impact of administrative burdens on Black
Americans. See WILLIAM A. DARITY & A. KIRSTEN MULLEN, FROM HERE TO EQUALITY:
REPARATIONS FOR BLACK AMERICANS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2020) (identifying
intergenerational effects of the harms of slavery, the Jim Crow regime, and subsequent
ongoing mass incarceration, among other factors, as justification for reparations). This
challenge is also great for immigrants new to the tax system in the United States. Outreach
and education to taxpayers who speak English as a second language (“ESL”) is explicitly
recognized as a service eligible for federal “Low Income Taxpayer Clinics” grants, so there
is at least some government awareness of the challenges this population faces in meeting
their tax obligations. See Information for Potential LITC Grantees, IRS, https://www.irs.
gov/advocate/low-income-taxpayer-clinics/information-for-potential-litc-grantees (Mar. 2,
2022). Moreover, the IRS has introduced Form 1040 SP (the Spanish version of the
Individual Income Tax Return) as well as Schedule LEP (Form 1040), Request for Change
in Language Preferences, allowing taxpayers to designate one of twenty languages in which
to receive communications. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2021-56, IRS
Expands Help to Taxpayers in Multiple Languages with New Forms, Communication
Preferences (Mar. 16, 2021). Thus, the IRS has taken steps to overcome language barriers of
the ESL/immigrant population and can monitor the usage of these forms to identify
additional systemic problems. Not so with the Black American taxpayer population.
28. IRS has argued that, by not tracking information related to taxpayer race and
ethnicity, the agency does not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity. See 2020 Filing
Season and IRS COVID-19 Recovery: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 117th Cong. 34
(2020) [hereinafter 2020 Filing Season Hearing], https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/
CHRG-116shrg45917/CHRG-116shrg45917.pdf (statement of Charles P. Rettig, Comm’r,
Internal Revenue Serv., in response to questioning from Senator Sherrod Brown).
Commissioner RETTIG. There are no race or geographic issues that come up
with respect to audit selection . . . .
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agencies examine their policies and programs to identify whether and how
they perpetuate barriers to equal opportunity,29 the Treasury and IRS are
attempting to develop an empirical methodology for analyzing the racial
and ethnic equity implications of tax policy and tax administration
questions.30 If the IRS can meaningfully gauge the impact of tax
administration policy choices on racial and ethnic groups, it should evaluate
the impact of administrative burdens on those groups as part of its efforts to
reduce structural barriers to people of color and other disadvantaged
communities.
The second condition is present when the IRS action or program impairs
a defined taxpayer right. As we discuss, when these burdens deprive a
protected class of taxpayers of their fundamental taxpayer rights, we
propose that the IRS conduct a taxpayer-rights-and-administrative-burden
analysis with respect to that protected taxpayer segment.31 During that
analysis, the IRS would identify the specific administrative burdens present
in the program that pose challenges to the population, as well as how those
burdens, if left unaddressed, will impair specific taxpayer rights provided in
Code § 7803(a)(3).32 That analysis connects this Article’s inquiry to
taxpayer rights, and in particular to taxpayers who, in the absence of
proactive efforts to reduce, eliminate, or shift those burdens, may
experience a tax system in tension with those rights.

Senator BROWN. . . . But can you assure me, and assure the American
people, . . . that IRS audit rates . . . do not disproportionately hit black and
brown people?
Commissioner RETTIG. Yes.
....
Commissioner RETTIG. Senator, I would like to add, we have a zero
tolerance in the Internal Revenue Service for issues of discrimination.
Id.
29. Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021-01753.pdf.
30. Wally Adeyemo & Lily Batchelder, Advancing Equity Analysis in Tax Policy, U.S.
DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 14, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/advanc
ing-equity-analysis-in-tax-policy (noting that, in light of the Biden Administration’s
executive order on advancing racial equity, the Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy is
“attempting to develop a general and reliable empirical methodology for analyzing the
racial/ethnic equity implications of tax policy and tax administration questions” despite the
IRS not collecting racial data).
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part IV.
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Before progressing to the framework we propose in this Article, we
recognize the stark reality that the IRS has, for the better part of the last
decade, faced significant challenges related to funding.33 The goal of
identifying and reducing burdens cannot be accomplished in a vacuum, and
policymakers must act in a way that is at least sensitive to agency resources,
as well as the costs that inaction or action imposes on taxpayers. We do not
claim that a consideration of costs and benefits has no place in tax
administration; instead, we believe that the IRS and Congress should
prioritize efforts that will likely have a greater impact on removing burdens
that impede the ability for all taxpayers, especially vulnerable taxpayers, to
enjoy the rights both the IRS and Congress have identified in the Taxpayer
Bill of Rights. Our approach borrows from progressive critics of costbenefit analysis, who have emphasized how agency practice that relies
exclusively on cost-benefit analysis results in a failure to reflect other
values like redistribution34 and values that Congress may specifically
identify in organic agency statutes.35 That criticism resonates in the context
of tax administration, as Congress has specifically required the
Commissioner of the IRS to ensure that its employees “act in accord” with

33. For an interesting discussion of the intersection of declining funding and
congressionally imposed additional responsibilities, see Steve R. Johnson, The Future of
American Tax Administration: Conceptual Alternatives and Political Realities, 7 COLUM. J.
TAX L. 5 (2016).
34. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489,
1490 (2018) (acknowledging the dominant academic view that regulatory policy should
focus on maximizing net benefits and not be concerned with distributive consequences).
Revesz traces this back to the influential work of Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, who argued that substantive tax policy is a better vehicle for redistributive concerns
than legal rules. See id.; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
Other progressives have attempted to monetize the benefits associated with actions that may
promote rights, thus bringing a welfarist perspective to a rights-based agenda. See William J.
Aceves, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Human Rights, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 431, 436 (2018)
(arguing that while rights are not easily monetized, progressives should reflect the empirical
approach to evaluating policy choices to ensure that “states could more accurately consider
the net benefits of protecting human rights”).
35. See James Goodwin, The Progressive Case Against Cost-Benefit Analysis, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, https://progressivereform.org/our-work/regulatory-policy/progress
ive-case-against-cost-benefit-analysis/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2022) (“Rejecting cost-benefit
analysis doesn’t mean turning a blind eye to the effects of regulations . . . . To the contrary, it
means paying careful attention to the specific instructions that Congress provided to
agencies in the statutes that it adopted.”).
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essential taxpayer rights.36 Even Cass Sunstein, one of the key proponents
of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory state, has recognized that, at times,
distributional concerns should take priority over a purely welfarist
approach.37
The approach we suggest does not mean that Congress and the IRS
should ignore costs when weighing tax-administration policy decisions.38
Moreover, by requiring that the IRS consider the impact of its actions on
taxpayer rights, our proposal assumes that violations of taxpayer rights be
treated as costs in any cost-benefit analysis. They are not currently so
treated. How those costs are quantified might be left open and subjected to
a reasonableness analysis and is a topic worthy of further consideration. To
be sure, protecting rights can be costly; however, not protecting rights may

36. I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3).
37. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018) (discussing the
concept of prioritarianism and how, at times, even if the costs of a regulation may exceed its
benefits, the distributional concerns should take priority over a purely welfarist approach
when the benefits of a proposal inure largely to those who are less well-off).
38. Executive Order (“E.O.”) 12866 instructs agencies to select regulatory approaches
that maximize net benefits—including economic, distributive, and equity effects—unless a
statute requires another regulatory approach. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190, §
1(a) (Oct. 4, 1993). Any regulation that is determined to be “significant” must be submitted
to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for review, along with an
analysis of the costs and benefits of that regulation. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL32397, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND
REGULATORY AFFAIRS (2009), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL32397.pdf. For years, tax
administration was largely exempt from the requirements of E.O. 12866 and its successor
executive orders, but in 2018 the Treasury and the IRS agreed to adhere to them. Clinton G.
Wallace, Centralized Review of Tax Regulations, 70 ALA. L. REV. 455, 458–59 (2018). The
agreement requires the Treasury to submit quarterly notices of all planned tax regulatory
actions to the OIRA and provides that the “OIRA will review any regulatory actions that
‘create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by
another agency,’ or that ‘raise novel legal or policy issues, such as by prescribing a rule of
conduct backed by an assessable payment.’” Id. at 479 (quoting Memorandum of Agreement
Between the Dep’t of the Treasury and the Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Review of Tax
Regulations Under Executive Order 12866, at 1 (Apr. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Memorandum
of Agreement, E.O. 12866], https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20
Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf). Finally, consistent with its application to
other agencies, E.O. 12866 requires the “Treasury to produce a quantified cost-benefit
analysis of the proposed regulation and alternatives” for regulatory actions that have “an
annual non-revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or more.” Id. (quoting
Memorandum of Agreement, E.O. 12866, supra, at 1).
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be even more costly when calculating the cost of non-compliance resulting
from the failure to protect rights and to promote compliance.39
As discussed below, we suggest that the IRS can take actions that
minimize agency costs while ensuring that taxpayer rights are promoted and
taxpayer burdens are lessened. We recognize that a proposal that shifts the
focus away from a direct measuring of agency costs or expands what is
currently considered as a cost will likely meet some skepticism (especially
from executives within the agency who face most directly decisions that
involve difficult resource allocations). Accordingly, the IRS can efficiently
reduce burdens by using data proactively or partnering with the private
sector (so long as it or the private actor does not violate fundamental
taxpayer rights).40
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part II explains the Herd/Moynihan
framework of administrative burdens. In Part II, we also consider sludge—a
subset of administrative burdens that has found an unfortunate home in tax
administration. In the first half of Part III, we discuss the current ways of
measuring and addressing burdens in the tax system, including reviewing
the Regulatory Flexibility Act,41 the Paperwork Reduction Act,42 and the
39. In the 2020 Annual Report to Congress, the National Taxpayer Advocate (“NTA”)
lists the IRS’s struggle with funding and its impact on employee hiring, training, and
retention as one of taxpayers’ most serious problems. See ANNUAL REPORT 2020, supra note
16, at 12–27.
40. As an example of a private sector partnership that successfully reduced burdens, the
Treasury and the IRS worked with Code for America to facilitate the delivery of advanced
child tax credit payments that were temporarily available during the calendar year 2021. See
Readout: Treasury, White House, and Code for America Host Call to Discuss Collaboration
and Launch of New Bilingual and Mobile-Friendly Sign-Up Tool for Advance Child Tax
Credit, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Sept. 1, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/
jy0341; Press Release, Code for Am., Code for America Launches Free Mobile-Friendly
GetCTC Portal Available in English and Spanish (Sept. 1, 2021), https://codeforamerica.
org/news/code-for-america-launches-free-mobile-friendly-getctc-portal-available-in-englishand-spanish/. Partnerships between the IRS and nonprofit organizations to minimize
taxpayer burdens is a topic worthy of additional consideration beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally Finance Republicans Raise Privacy Concerns with IRS Collaboration,
MIKE CRAPO: U.S. SEN. FOR IDAHO (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/
newsreleases/-finance-republicans-raise-privacy-concerns-with-irs-collaboration (presenting
the security concerns of several Senate Finance Committee members for the IRS
collaboration with Code for America).
41. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
42. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521).
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Privacy Act.43 The current measurements are not tax specific but apply to
agencies across the federal government. In the second half of Part III, we
discuss the specific burdens the tax system can impose on taxpayers and
how the taxpayer-rights legislation provides a source for identifying
taxpayer-specific burdens the IRS should address.
Part IV turns prescriptive and provides a framework for reducing
administrative burdens through mandating that the IRS prepare and release
taxpayer-rights impact statements. Part IV also explores how placing
framework oversight in the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate can ensure
that the IRS measures and proactively reduces the burdens that prevent
taxpayers from realizing essential taxpayer rights. In Part V, we return to
scenario one in this Introduction and apply our framework. In doing so, we
reveal how applying our approach can lead to a tax system that (1)
prioritizes identifying and eliminating burdens before they harm taxpayers
and (2) allows for redirecting agency efforts to mitigate burdens that may
inadvertently or intentionally impinge on taxpayer rights. In Part VI, we
conclude our discussion.
II. Administrative Burdens and Sludge
A. The Herd/Moynihan Administrative Burden Framework
The IRS defines taxpayer burdens as “the time and money taxpayers
spend to comply with their federal tax obligations.”44 The IRS itself
estimates the tax compliance burden approximates seventy-one percent of
the entire annual federal paperwork burden.45 Researchers estimate the
aggregate cost of federal tax compliance exceeds $200 billion annually,
though estimates fail to account for post-filing costs, such as time and
money spent on (1) audits, (2) requests for information arising from
misreporting items subject to third-party information returns, and (3)
collection matters.46
43. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a).
44. About Taxpayer Burden Reduction, supra note 13.
45. See Sam Batkins, Evaluating the Paperwork Reduction Act: Are Burdens Being
Reduced?, AM. ACTION F. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/testi
mony/evaluating-paperwork-reduction-act-burdens-reduced/.
46. See JASON J. FICHTNER ET AL., BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., TAX ADMINISTRATION:
COMPLIANCE, COMPLEXITY, AND CAPACITY 6 (2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/
?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Tax-Administration-Compliance-Complexity-Capacity.
pdf. These estimates also fail to reflect the time that taxpayers spend attempting to access the
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While researchers and the IRS have attempted to quantify the costs of
federal tax compliance, public administration scholars Professors Pamela
Herd and Don Moynihan have examined in greater detail the types of costs
individuals experience when interacting with government. Their holistic
burdens framework reveals a truer picture of the burdens that taxpayers face
throughout tax administration. In Administrative Burden: Policymaking by
Other Means, Herd and Moynihan define administrative burden as the
learning, compliance, and psychological costs that citizens experience when
they interact with government.47 Learning costs are the costs people
encounter when searching for information about government-provided
services.48 Compliance costs are costs arising from complying with a
program’s rules and regulations.49 Psychological costs are costs related to
the stress, lack of autonomy, or stigma associated with having to learn
about a program or comply with its requirements.50
Herd and Moynihan describe how burdens can arise inadvertently or
intentionally. Inadvertent burdens can arise due to officials’ lack of
awareness, especially when there may be a chasm between administrators
and the circumstances of the people they regulate.51 Administrative burdens
also are tools that political actors can use to achieve ideological goals that
undermine the essential goals of the programs and harm some of our
nation’s most vulnerable citizens.52 In these instances of intentionally
IRS, either in person or by telephone. For example, the NTA reports that in FY 2020, the
IRS received more than 100 million phone calls to its toll-free line, but the agency was only
able to answer approximately twenty-four million of those calls. See ANNUAL REPORT 2020,
supra note 16, at vi.
47. PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN: POLICYMAKING
BY OTHER MEANS 2 (2018).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 16–17. See generally Leslie Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and the Tax
System, 69 TAX LAW. 567, 569 (2016) (citing Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression:
Its Causes and Cures, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 291, 300 (2012)); Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic
Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3, 13 (1984) (describing
burden disentitlement).
52. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 47, at 8–9. As one example of this, Herd and
Moynihan discuss the Trump Administration’s broad efforts to impose work requirements
on the receipt of a wide range of public benefits, including for recipients of Medicaid and the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps). See id. at 116, 143. A related
concept to administrative burdens is racialized burdens, which explores the experiences of
how learning, compliance, and psychological costs contribute to racial inequality. See id. at
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created burdens, the presence or creation of administrative burdens can act
as an indirect method to undermine policy goals, masking objections to
policies that might otherwise promote equity or racial justice.53
By adopting as a starting point the individual experience with
government rather than agency rules or procedures, the Herd/Moynihan
framework focuses on the distributional impact of burdens, emphasizing
“the individual experience of burden is distinct from the rules and
process.”54 This starting point is significant because it highlights that
burdens are not equally distributed:
They are targeted toward some groups more than others. Thus,
although interactions with the state can alter people’s civic skills,
their ability to negotiate those interactions will also be
influenced by their existing skills. Human capital—such as
education, money, social networks, intelligence, psychological
resources, and health—matter to how people cope with
administrative burdens.55

2. Scholars such as Herd and Moynihan and Victor Ray explore how policymakers can use
these burdens to normalize and reinforce racial inequality, even in the absence of explicit or
overtly racist rules or actions. See id. at 6; Ray et al., supra note 26 (manuscript at 11–12).
53. With respect to burdens directly related to issues of racial justice, see Ray et al.,
supra note 26 (exploring the intersection of burdens that directly frustrate essential
individual citizenship rights and the perpetuation of disparate racial outcomes). To be sure,
we do not mean to suggest that the presence of intentional burdens within the tax system
always or primarily originates with politically appointed Treasury officials attempting to
achieve policy objectives that Congress or other political actors have rejected. In the tax
system, it is more likely that interjecting burdens between taxpayers and their statutory rights
(such as the right to a hearing in the collection process) is a result of executive but
nonpolitical employee decisions that emphasize minimizing short-term costs associated with
collecting assessed liabilities. On the other hand, the decision to fund the IRS at inadequate
levels so that the IRS is facing difficult resource decisions and to contribute to dissatisfaction
with the tax system generally may be a more macro-level policy decision to generally make
interactions between taxpayers and the government less pleasant and weaken the IRS. See
generally Kiel & Eisinger, supra note 17. We also acknowledge that the tax system is not
immune to pressure from politically appointed officials, which could trigger burdens that fall
on vulnerable taxpayers. See Leslie Book, Tax Administration and Racial Justice: The
Illegal Denial of Tax-Based Pandemic Relief to the Nation’s Incarcerated Population, 72
S.C. L. REV. 667, 669–70 (2021) [hereinafter Book, Tax Administration and Racial Justice]
(discussing the Treasury Inspector General’s report of the IRS’s unexplained switch to
denying COVID-19 pandemic benefits for the incarcerated).
54. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 47, at 22.
55. Id. at 30.
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What may be inconsequential for one individual or class of individuals may
be significant for others:
[I]ndividual decisions depend on how individuals construe the
world, not on objective measures of costs and benefits. This
construal is shaped by contextual factors that frame burdens and
interact with individual psychological processes, including
cognitive biases that generate a disproportionate response to
burden. This basic insight explains why burdens that seem minor
and defensible when designed by the administrator can exert
dramatic negative effects when experienced by a citizen.56
Moreover, Herd and Moynihan discuss the uneven distribution of human
capital across society.57 Those with resources often have the time and
money either to navigate the burdens on their own or to pay third parties to
avoid the direct impact the administrative burdens present.
Not only is human capital unevenly distributed, but the stresses of
poverty may exacerbate the burdens’ effects. For example, people
experiencing financial stress and other disruptions associated with poverty
may make poorer decisions than when they are not facing stress or
experiencing hardships.58 Research that Herd and Moynihan draw on
explores how the effects of poverty can lead to a scarcity of cognitive
bandwidth that can prevent or hinder completion of tasks or lead to poorer
decisions and outcomes.59
Related to bandwidth concerns is the concept of clustering. As
Professors Wolf and De-Shalit explore, when several conditions are present

56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Researchers have conducted studies on scarcity and cognitive impact. See Pub. Int.
Gov’t Rels. Off., Am. Psych. Ass’n, The Psychology of Scarcity: How Limited Resources
Affect Our Decisions and Behaviors (n.d.) (fact sheet), https://www.apa.org/advocacy/
socioeconomic-status/scarcity-fact-sheet.pdf; Ernst-Jan de Bruijn & Gerrit Antonides,
Poverty and Economic Decision Making: A Review of Scarcity Theory, 92 THEORY &
DECISION 5 (Mar. 9, 2021); Jirs Meuris & Carrie R. Leana, The High Cost of Low Wages:
Economic Scarcity Effects in Organizations, 35 RSCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 143 (2015).
59. See, e.g., SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: THE NEW SCIENCE
OF HAVING LESS AND HOW IT DEFINES OUR LIVES 47, 163 (2013) (using term bandwidth to
refer to cognitive capacity and the ability to pay attention and make good decisions, and
emphasizing that when studying and understanding poverty, “we must recognize that [the
poor] focus and they tunnel and they make mistakes; that they lack not only money but also
bandwidth”).
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simultaneously (such as poverty and concomitant stress), “[d]isadvantages
and risks compound each other and cluster together.”60
Simply put, for people with lower incomes, lower levels of education,
cognitive problems, and language barriers, administrative burdens may
delay or prevent access to benefits and “exacerbate inequality.”61
While denying or delaying access to benefits may be the immediate
consequence of burdens, there are costs beyond the essential loss of the
benefit. When burdens impede individuals from receiving a benefit, people
may sense that the government does not serve their interests. This can
alienate individuals, undermine faith and trust in government,62 and lead the
poor to feel shame about their condition.63 This too can exacerbate the
effect of the burdens to the loss of the benefit in question.
Herd and Moynihan are not the first to detail the concept of
administrative burdens or to single out varying types of costs arising when
individuals interact with the government, but they do so across a wide range
of policy areas, including voting rights, Medicare, and Supplemental
Nutritional Assistance Program (“SNAP,” commonly referred to as “food
60. JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 9–10 (2007) (proposing
that governments wishing to improve the lives of the least advantaged should strive to
decluster disadvantages by searching for disadvantages that compound to become corrosive
disadvantages).
61. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 47, at 4, 31. An important part of Herd and
Moynihan’s book is how political actors may deliberately construct administrative burdens
as a complement or alternate mechanism to achieve policy goals, looking to barriers to vote
and assorted work requirements in benefits provisions. See id. at 8–9. While politically
constructed burdens are less relevant in the tax system, Herd and Moynihan do discuss the
relationship between administrative capacity and the political process. See id. at 3–4. In
particular, congressional budgeting decisions and sheer capacity are important elements for
any agency. Id. at 31–32 (discussing congressional cuts to the IRS budget).
62. The distributional impact of additional burdens on lower income individuals is
likely to contribute to recognition gaps, or “disparities in worth and cultural membership
between groups in a society.” Michèle Lamont, Addressing Recognition Gaps:
Destigmatization and the Reduction of Inequality, 83 AM. SOCIO. REV. 419, 421–22 (2018).
Lamont recognizes the working poor may feel stigmatized in an increasingly downwardly
mobile society. Id. at 422. Putting additional, and at times insurmountable, barriers between
those individuals and benefits they are eligible to receive but not actually receiving likely
contributes to disparities between socioeconomic groups. See id.
63. American journalist Sarah Smarsh movingly describes that poor people may blame
themselves for their economic insecurities. SARAH SMARSH, HEARTLAND: A MEMOIR OF
WORKING HARD AND BEING BROKE IN THE RICHEST COUNTRY ON EARTH 134–38 (2018)
(describing the shame associated with the increased scrutiny and work requirements
surrounding welfare “reform”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

546

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:527

stamps”).64 Their approach has its roots in the public administration
literature surrounding red tape but differs in one key respect. Red tape
refers to rules, regulations, or procedures that generate a compliance burden
but may not, in fact, advance a legitimate purpose the rules were intended
to serve.65 In contrast, at times administrative burdens are necessary to
protect important political values, such as targeting benefits to families with
household earnings under a certain amount or encouraging a more efficient
use of agency resources. The IRS can justify many, although not all, of the
burdens that taxpayers experience by citing to a legitimate policy objective,
such as compliance or integrity.66
B. Sludge and Sludge Audits
Related to the concept of administrative burden is “sludge,” a term
coined by Professor Richard Thaler and further developed by Professor
Cass Sunstein.67 To understand sludge, it is necessary to start with its
cousin, “nudge.” Thaler and Sunstein, in their popular book Nudge:
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, refer to nudges
as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing
their economic incentives.”68 The idea generally was to focus on low-cost
ways to improve human health and happiness through things like helpful
text reminders of appointments, default rules, and good signage. More
recently, Sunstein refers to nudges as “private or public initiatives that steer
people in particular directions but that also allow them to go their own
way.”69

64. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
65. BARRY BOZEMAN, BUREAUCRACY AND RED TAPE 12 (2000).
66. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REP. NO. 2021-30-051, THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT EXAMINATION COMPLIANCE STRATEGY CAN BE IMPROVED (2021),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2021reports/202130051fr.pdf (emphasizing the
difficulty the IRS has in verifying on an ex ante basis whether taxpayers are eligible for
claimed credits).
67. See generally Richard H. Thaler, Editorial, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCI. 431, 431
(2018) [hereinafter Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge] (coining “sludge”).
68. CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008).
69. Cass R. Sunstein, Misconceptions About Nudges, 2 J. BEHAV. ECON. FOR POL’Y 61,
61 (2018).
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In 2018, Thaler, in a brief article in the journal Science, coined the term
“sludge” to refer to “activities that are essentially nudging for evil.”70
Sunstein builds on the term in two articles, Sludge and Ordeals71 and
Sludge Audits.72 In Sludge and Ordeals, Sunstein refers to sludge as “the
kind of friction, large or small, that people face when they want to go in one
or another direction.”73 Sludge can arise in experiences with a wide range of
actors, including banks, universities, and, of course, government agencies.74
Defined in this fashion, sludge could, in theory, be used to help, as in
imposing waiting periods for gun purchases or marriage licenses or
requiring an additional confirmation before nonrefundable purchases in
online shopping.75 In the later Sludge Audits, Sunstein slightly modifies the
term sludge to shift it from its status as a subset of nudges by focusing more
squarely on burdens that are either deliberately or unintentionally imposed
and that “have a negative valence.”76 Burdens that inhibit people from
acting recklessly or impulsively should be characterized as helpful nudges,
not as sludge. In distinguishing the term sludge from nudge, Sunstein
acknowledges and cites Herd and Moynihan’s work and their discussion of
70. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, supra note 67.
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J. 1843 (2019) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals].
72. Sunstein, Sludge Audits, supra note 18, at 1. It is also the topic of his book. See
SUNSTEIN, SLUDGE: WHAT STOPS US FROM GETTING THINGS DONE, supra note 18.
73. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, supra note 71, at 1850. After defining the term in this
way, Sunstein drops a footnote. Id. at 1850 n.25. He notes the possible difficulty in cleanly
distinguishing between sludges and nudges:
I am bracketing here the precise relationship between nudge and sludge. It is
most useful to see both terms as descriptive rather than normative. It should be
clear that nudges can be for good or for bad; on the bad, see George Akerlof &
Robert Shiller, Phishing for Phools (2015) (describing, among other examples,
the strategies that Cinnabon founder[s] Rich and Greg Komen developed to
push people to making the “unhealthy” decision to eat a Cinnabon). It should
also be clear that sludge can be for good or for bad. It is reasonable to see
sludge as a kind of nudge, in the form of increased friction, which can nudge
people in a helpful or unhelpful way. If people are nudged to choose healthy
over unhealthy food, through good choice architecture, they might face sludge
when they seek unhealthy food. To be sure, more work remains to be done on
definitional issues. My hope is that the examples will be sufficient for purposes
of the current discussion.
Id.
74. See Sunstein, Sludge Audits, supra note 18, at 15.
75. See Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, supra note 71, at 1868–69.
76. See Sunstein, Sludge Audits, supra note 18, at 7.
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administrative burdens.77 According to Sunstein, the concept of
administrative burdens is “much broader” than sludge.78 Administrative
burdens may be “excessive, insufficient or optimal.”79 In contrast, “sludge
is bad by definition; it consists of excessive frictions.”80
As Sunstein acknowledges,81 though does not fully explore, the term that
does a great deal of work in the definition is “excessive.” Because burdens
may serve important goals, such as eligibility screening in a program that
targets benefits to those with certain characteristics (such as income or
household composition), it is not necessarily clear that the presence of a
burden is objectionable. This leads to a normative question: what justifies
the burden? After all, reasonable people could differ on whether a burden
that deterred some eligible people from receiving a benefit was justified if it
in fact contributed to deterring or detecting ineligible recipients.82
Despite not resolving that question in all instances, Sunstein prescribes
as a necessary first step that government agencies, universities, and private
actors must conduct regular “sludge audits,” with the goal of improving the
experiences of people with whom they interact.83 Rather than provide a
detailed roadmap for how to conduct those audits, and whether in all
instances the actor should remove or reduce the sludge, Sunstein provides a
fairly high-level description to at least generate heightened awareness that
sludge may be present: “I have noted that Sludge Audits can take both
formal and informal forms. They might involve a great deal of
quantification, or they might be more qualitative. In either case, three
reforms would do a great deal to improve the current situation.”84
In acknowledging that a pure balancing of burdens’ costs and benefits is
both practically difficult and may not lead to an answer to the normative
question as to whether the burdens are excessive, Sunstein argues the audit

77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 4–5.
82. Interestingly, in expanding on this notion, Sunstein uses the Earned Income Tax
Credit system to illustrate the challenge with determining whether a burden is excessive or
justified in light of its ability to help separate eligible from ineligible claimants. Id. at 14–15.
We expand on sludge and the Earned Income Tax Credit later in this Article. See infra note
178.
83. Sunstein, Sludge Audits, supra note 18, at 15–17.
84. Id. at 16.
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itself can help focus on the burdens’ proportionality.85 Moreover, the very
act of auditing burdens itself may produce a benefit in that, in Sunstein’s
view, it would be “information forcing” and create incentives to more
properly measure impact and to create an awareness that “the existing level
of sludge is not in [public and private institutions’] interests.”86
III. IRS Approaches to Measure and Address
Privacy Intrusions and Burdens
Having provided some context for how scholars outside the tax system
both define administrative burden and suggest a framework for reducing
excessive burdens, in Section III.A we discuss current laws requiring
federal agencies to address burdens on the public and how the IRS handles
those provisions. Because of the tax system’s scope, some of these broadbased burden provisions have a direct—if not necessarily significant—
impact on the tax system. Of the current broad-based burden-protection
provisions, the provisions governing privacy offer the closest model to the
system we propose for appropriately targeted reductions to the burdens of
the tax system. We address these provisions first, in Section III.A.
After describing the current framework for burden protection and how it
applies to the IRS, in Section III.B we demonstrate the current framework’s
failure to capture and to provide a means for reducing the full measure of

85. Sunstein, like Herd and Moynihan, focuses on the distributive impact of burdens:
As a practical matter, the burden of sludge is often borne principally by poor
people, and that is a burden that they cannot readily bear. A central reason for
this is that poor people must focus on a wide range of immediately pressing
problems. If a private or public institution is asking poor people to navigate a
complex system or to fill out a lot of forms, they might give up. But the
problem is hardly limited to the poor. When programs are designed to benefit
the elderly, sludge might be especially damaging, at least if the population
suffers from reduced cognitive capacity. Something similar can be said for
immigrants or for people who suffer from a language barrier. For different
reasons, the problem of sex equality deserves particular attention. Because
women do a disproportionate amount of administrative work—running the
household, arranging meals, taking care of children—a significant reduction in
sludge could address a pervasive source of social inequality, with ramifying
effects on other areas of life.
Id. at 12; see also id. at 4 (“[Sludge audits] can promote economic development and growth.
In many contexts, efforts to reduce sludge will have disproportionate benefits for the most
disadvantaged members of society; they can be an engine of opportunity.”).
86. Id. at 16.
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administrative burdens. The primary failure of the non-tax-specific burdenreduction provisions stems from the need, missing from the broad-based
burden-reduction provisions, to address burden reduction through the lens
of taxpayer rights.
A. Existing Approaches for the IRS
1. Privacy Act and Privacy Impact Assessments
Unlike the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”)87 and the Paperwork
Reduction Act (“PRA”)88 described in sections 2 and 3 below, the statutory
provisions designed to protect privacy do not address burden reduction so
much as they do intrusion reduction. The congressional concerns regarding
privacy result from the same urge to protect citizens from an overly
intrusive government;89 however, the focus and the system of assessment
with the privacy provisions approach the problem from a slightly different
angle. Two provisions, the Privacy Act and Privacy Impact Assessments
(“PIAs”), provide protection broadly across government agencies.90 The
Privacy Act operates on an individual level, while PIAs operate on a
broader, systemic level. These provisions provide the closest model for the
proposal in this Article for development of a system to protect taxpayer
rights.
The Privacy Act of 1974 is a companion provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) complementing the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”).91 The Privacy Act has roots in the Bill of Rights. The preface to

87. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
88. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521).
89. See generally U.S. DEP’T JUST., OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 1 (2020
ed.) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT], https://www.justice.gov/Overview_2020/
download (“In the words of the [Privacy Act] bill’s principal sponsor, Judiciary Chairman
Senator Sam Ervin, ‘[i]f we have learned anything in this last year of Watergate, it is that
there must be limits upon what the Government can know about each of its citizens.’”
(second alteration in original)).
90. The disclosure provisions of I.R.C. § 6103 do provide specific guidance to the IRS
regarding the safeguarding of taxpayer information, but they seek to address a slightly
different issue, one that is both broader and narrower than the issue addressed by the Privacy
Act and PIAs. See generally I.R.C. § 6103.
91. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552a).
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the Senate Committee’s “Legislative History of the Privacy Act” source
book stated that
[t]he Bill of Rights guarantees to each American protections
which we equate with specific rights of citizenship in a free
society. This legislation is a major first step in a continuing
effort to define the “penumbra” of privacy which emanates from
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights and which helps to give
them life and substance as recognized in Griswold v.
Connecticut.92
As applied to the IRS, the Privacy Act seeks to regulate the IRS’s
recordkeeping and disclosure practices. In passing the Privacy Act,
Congress’s goal was
curbing the illegal surveillance and investigation of individuals
by federal agencies that had been exposed during the Watergate
scandal [and the] potential abuses presented by the government’s
increasing use of computers to store and retrieve personal data
by means of a universal identifier—such as an individual’s social
security number.93
The Privacy Act establishes “fair information practices” that require the
IRS to (1) maintain only such information “about an individual that is
relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute”;94 (2) “collect information to the greatest extent
92. S. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS & H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S. 3418 (PUBLIC LAW 93-579): SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY at v (2d Sess. 1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY] (citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). This language also appears in the Internal
Revenue Manuals, with a discussion of the Privacy Act as interpreted by the IRS. See IRM
10.5.6.1.1 (Jan. 31, 2020). The Senate’s source book provides a legislative history of the
Privacy Act. The Department of Justice archives suggest that because this bill passed on the
final week of the Ninety-Third Congress with no conference committee convened to
reconcile the differences in the bills of the two chambers, the original reports may provide
limited assistance in understanding the final statute, and a more reliable source of legislative
history exists in a staff-prepared document entitled “Analysis of House and Senate
Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act.” OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT,
supra note 89, at 4 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 40,405–09, 40,881–83 (1974), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra, at 858–68, 987–94).
93. Overview of the Privacy Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/
archives/opcl/policy-objectives (Feb. 24, 2021).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1).
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practicable directly from the [taxpayer]”;95 and (3) maintain the records it
uses in making a determination concerning a taxpayer “with such accuracy,
relevance, timeliness and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure
fairness to the individual in the determination.”96
To carry out its responsibilities and process requests under the FOIA and
the Privacy Act, as well as the specific limitations placed on maintaining
the privacy of taxpayer information pursuant to I.R.C. § 6103, the IRS has
adopted procedural regulations and established a separate disclosure
organization dedicated to these issues.97
Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to
conduct PIAs for electronic information systems and collections of
information.98 The concept of impact assessments arose in the 1970s with
the Environmental Impact Statement.99 The PIA is a systematic method of
guiding government agencies through a process of assessing privacy risks
during the early stages of developing a new system of information
technology that seeks to collect new information or seeks to handle
collections of personally identifiable information, as well as throughout IT
95. Id. § 552a(e)(2).
96. Id. § 552a(e)(5).
97. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.702; IRM 10.5.6.1 (Jan. 31, 2020). Authority to make FOIA
determinations about records under their jurisdiction is given to “[t]he Director,
Governmental Liaison, Disclosure, and Safeguards (GLDS) and their delegate.” See IRM
11.3.13.1.2 (Oct. 5, 2021). As with the matters covered by the FOIA, disclosure and the
Privacy Act, the PIA is housed in the Privacy, Policy and Compliance (“PPC”) office of the
Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure (“PGLD”) office. See IRM 10.5.6.1 (Jan. 31,
2020) (“The PPC office, under PGLD, is the program office responsible for oversight of the
Servicewide Privacy Act policy, recordkeeping matters, access and amendment matters,
accounting for disclosures program, and personnel records matters. PGLD’s Disclosure
office is responsible for operational casework related to requests for access to and disclosure
of Privacy Act information via the Central Processing Unit.”). See generally IRM 10.5.6.3.1
(Jan. 31, 2020) (detailing PPC’s responsibilities). The PIA and IRS Privacy and Civil
Liberties Impact Assessment (“PCLIA”) process is housed under the Privacy Compliance
Assurance program, for which the Director of the PPC is responsible. See IRM 10.5.2.1.3
(Jan. 24, 2020); IRM 10.5.2.2 (Jan. 24, 2020). The specific creation of PCLIAs (which is the
term the IRS seems to prefer for PIAs) falls to a PCLIA preparer who is designated by the
System Owner, and that starts the process. See generally IRM 10.5.2.2.3 (Jan. 24, 2020).
The full chain of creation/approval is listed in IRM 10.5.2.2.3. See id. The IRS has stated
that the PPC is responsible for conducting and publishing PCLIAs. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 5499, PRIVACY PROGRAM PLAN 5–6 (2020).
98. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(b), 116 Stat. 2899, 2922.
99. Roger Clarke, Privacy Impact Assessment: Its Origins and Development, 25
COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 123, 125 (2009).
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systems development.100 This process enables agencies to determine how a
project will affect individuals’ privacy and whether the project’s objectives
can be met while also protecting privacy.
The PIA has three main goals:
1. ensure conformance with applicable legal, regulatory, and policy
requirements for privacy;
2. identify and evaluate risks of privacy breaches or other such
incidents; and
3. identify appropriate privacy controls to mitigate unacceptable
risks.101
Through enforcement of the Privacy Act and assessment of systems
using PIAs, government agencies provide protection from unwarranted
intrusion of individual information. The goals of information assessment as
carried out in PIAs provide a model for the goals of assessing how a
provision protects—or fails to protect—taxpayer rights.
2. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Congress recognized the burdens that regulations can impose on small
businesses. Without giving sufficient thought to the special circumstances
of small business, regulation writers within administrative agencies could
make assumptions, based on their experience with larger entities, that could
have a crippling impact on small businesses. To address this concern,
Congress passed the RFA to force the writers of regulations to consider and
address small-business concerns in writing regulations that will impact
small entities.102 The RFA defines “small entities” to include small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions.103
100. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, M-03-22, OMB
GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF
2002 (2003), https://www.justice.gov/opcl/page/file/1131721/download.
101. See id.
102. See generally Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 601(6). Small businesses include businesses that satisfy the Small
Business Administration’s size standards. Id. § 601(3); see also 15 U.S.C. § 632 (“[A] smallbusiness concern . . . shall be deemed to be one which is independently owned and operated
and which is not dominant in its field of operation.”). Most businesses likely will be
classified as “small” under those standards. Typically, this group would include business
entities with under $25 million in annual gross receipts. See generally Regulations
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When an agency makes a regulation available for public comment, it
must make an initial regulatory flexibility analysis.104 When publishing the
final rule, the agency must publish a final regulatory flexibility analysis.105
Through the initial and final regulatory flexibility analyses, the agency must
describe the rule’s effect on small businesses, analyze alternatives that
might minimize adverse economic consequences, and make its analyses
available for public comment.106 The RFA contains an exception that
relieves an agency of performing a regulatory flexibility analysis if the
agency “certifies that the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”107
Legislative history of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996108—an amendment to the RFA—reflects
congressional concerns regarding agencies “neglecting their duties under
the RFA through casual agency certifications of non-applicability or
insufficient analyses.”109 Judicial review exists for certain RFA
provisions.110 If the agency takes the position that a regulation will not have
a significant impact on small business entities, it must attach a statement of
the factual basis supporting that conclusion.111 The RFA “requires nothing
more than that the agency file a [final regulatory flexibility analysis]

Regarding the Transition Tax Under Section 965 and Related Provisions, 84 Fed. Reg. 1838,
1873 n.1 (Feb. 5, 2019) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (defining a “small business” as “a
multinational corporation with less than $25 million in gross receipts”).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
105. Id. § 604(a).
106. Id. § 603(a)–(d); id. § 604(a)–(b).
107. Id. § 605(b).
108. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847
(1996) (enacting the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996).
109. W. Va. Chamber of Com. v. Browner, No. 98-1013, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30621,
*11 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 1998).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a). Although judicial review is possible, the Silver case demonstrates
the limits of judicial review. See Silver v. Internal Revenue Serv., 531 F. Supp. 3d 346
(D.D.C. 2021). After denying the IRS’s motion to dismiss a taxpayer’s challenge to a
regulation based on the RFA, the district court granted summary judgement to the IRS
because the taxpayer failed to meet the standing test by showing a concrete interest that
could have been better protected had the IRS met the procedural requirements of the RFA.
Silver v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 19-CV-247 (APM), 2019 WL 7168625, at *3 (D.D.C.
Dec. 24, 2019); Silver, 531 F. Supp. 3d at 363–66.
111. See 5 U.S.C. § 605(b).
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demonstrating a ‘reasonable, good-faith effort to carry out [RFA’s]
mandate.’”112
3. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”) is another broad-based burdenreduction provision that also applies to the IRS.113 Because of the nature
and scope of the IRS’s work, the PRA plays a much greater role in its
operations than does the RFA.
The PRA seeks to “ensure the greatest possible public benefit from and
maximize the utility of information created, collected, maintained, used,
shared and disseminated by or for the Federal Government.”114 Another
goal of the PRA is to “improve the quality and use of Federal information
to strengthen decisionmaking, accountability, and openness in Government
and society.”115 The burden of meeting the PRA’s goals falls on the federal
agencies seeking to collect information.116 To meet those goals, the
agencies should devise systems that effectively collect information and
make it available to users inside and outside of the federal government.117
In seeking to satisfy the requirements of the PRA, agencies must meet
two primary responsibilities prior to engaging in information collection: (1)
providing the public with an opportunity to comment on the informationgathering activity and (2) submitting the proposal for collection of
112. U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Alenco Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 625 (5th Cir. 2000)).
113. For more detailed discussion of the PRA, see Adam M. Samaha, Death and
Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279 (2015) (collecting articles on the history and
application of the PRA in footnote 11). Professor Samaha begins his article by pointing out
that in 2014, the IRS estimated that “individual taxpayers would spend 1.9 billion hours
preparing their federal tax returns.” Id. at 280.
114. 44 U.S.C. § 3501(2). For a brief discussion of the PRA and its interaction with the
IRS, see Sam Wice, The Paperwork Reduction Act and Why You May Be Able to File Your
Taxes on a Napkin in 2021, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 29, 2020), https://
www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-paperwork-reduction-act-and-why-you-may-be-able-to-file-yourtaxes-on-a-napkin-in-2021/.
115. 44 U.S.C. § 3501(5).
116. The PRA applies to almost all but not all federal agencies. The PRA’s scope
excludes, inter alia, the Federal Election Commission, the General Accounting Office, the
D.C. Government, territorial governments and “[g]overnment-owned contractor-operated
facilities.” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1); see also Kuzma v. U.S. Postal Serv., 798 F.2d 29, 32 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding the U.S. Postal Service exempt from the PRA but not the Postal Rate
Commission).
117. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(b).
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information to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”)
within the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”).118
The OMB defines “information” as “any statement or estimate of fact or
opinion, regardless of form or format, whether in numerical, graphic, or
narrative form, and whether oral or maintained on paper, electronic or other
media.”119 The categories of information within this definition clearly
include essentially all the information-gathering returns and forms used by
the IRS.120 The definition of “person” in the PRA statute does not vary
greatly from the definition of person in the Internal Revenue Code.121
Both mandatory and voluntary collection of information is subject to the
PRA requirements.122 Not all information gathering by agencies triggers the
PRA provisions. Certain actions do not count as information gathering, and
certain items do not count as information.123 Generally, an agency can
gather information in public meetings, including online versions of public
meetings, without triggering the PRA.124 Case-specific information
gathered by agencies does not count as information for purposes of PRA.125
So, for example, while the IRS would need approval to establish a return
requirement, it would not need approval under the PRA to request
information from a specific taxpayer in connection with an audit of that
individual.
While the PRA requires agencies to estimate the amount of time it takes
to comply with a request for information, the determination of the item

118. For more information on the OIRA and the role it plays in this process, see Cass R.
Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1838 (2013).
119. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(h).
120. See generally id. § 1320.3(c). Because the PRA applies identical questions imposed
on ten or more persons within a twelve-month period, it is hard to imagine a tax return form
that would not be covered.
121. Compare 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (defining “person” as “an individual, partnership,
association, corporation, business trust, or legal representative, an organized group of
individuals, a State, territorial, tribal, or local government or branch thereof, or a political
subdivision of a State, territory, tribal, or local government or a branch of a political
subdivision”), with I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (defining “person” as meaning and including “an
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation”).
122. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c).
123. See 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c), (h).
124. See id. § 1320.3(h)(8).
125. See id. § 1320.3(h)(1).
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being timed is fairly narrow.126 The time measured includes reading
instructions; searching for information needed to answer the information
request; and filling out, reviewing, and returning the forms.127 The PRA
calculation of time does not include researching background information
such as statutes or regulations, traveling to the government office when
necessary, waiting in line, or engaging in similar ancillary actions that may
be necessary in order to comply.128
For information subject to the PRA, the agency must provide the
opportunity for public comment before making the request.129 It does this
by developing an information-gathering request and publishing the request
in the Federal Register sixty days before seeking the information.130 The
notice must contain certain specific guidance to the public, seeking
comment on the necessity of gathering the proposed information, the
accuracy of the agency’s burden evaluation, the quality and clarity of the
information request, and suggestions on how to alter the request to reduce
its burden.131 Once the comment period ends, the agency must review and
evaluate the responses it receives to determine if it should alter its
request.132 At that point, the agency publishes a second notice advising the
public that the request has gone to the OMB for review of the request, the
comments, and any proposed change.133 This second notice initiates another
comment period, providing the public the opportunity to comment to the
OMB on the request during the thirty-day period of its consideration.134
126. For a discussion of the IRS practice of calculating the burden of the forms it creates,
see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUBL’N NO. 13315, TAX
COMPLIANCE BURDEN (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/d13315.pdf (prepared by IRS
employees from the offices of the Research, Applied Analytics and Statistics Division and
the Wage and Investment Tax Forms and Publications Division). See also Samaha, supra
note 113, at 280–81 (discussing the time and dollar estimates attributed to tax forms and the
manner in which the IRS calculates these measures).
127. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(2).
128. See Samaha, supra note 113, at 286–87, 287 n.34.
129. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2).
130. Id. § 3506(c)(1)–(2). Many of the requests will draw few if any comments because
of their routine nature or because no party has a sufficient financial or other interest in the
information request. See Samaha, supra note 113, at 288 (“The latest IRS proposal for
individual income tax forms drew a grand total of zero public comments after notice in the
Federal Register.”).
131. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2).
132. Id. § 3507(a)(1)(B).
133. Id. § 3507(a)(1)(D).
134. Id. § 3507(b).
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An agency can shorten this process under certain circumstances if the
agency can meet the criteria for a generic or expedited review imposed by
the OIRA.135 These abbreviated procedures recognize that some requests
seek routine information that imposes a relatively low burden and that the
agency can demonstrate that the specific situation requires exigency.136 The
OMB review of the information request seeks to ensure that the requested
information is necessary to agency goals and gathers the information in the
least intrusive manner and at the lowest cost.137 In addition to the general
review, the OIRA looks at the request to ensure that it follows existing laws
and regulations.138
B. The Need to Add Protection of Taxpayer Rights to Existing Approaches
The current system, which requires the IRS to determine (1) how its
regulations impact small businesses, (2) how it imposes paperwork burdens,
and (3) how it intrudes on taxpayers’ privacy, does nothing to provide
similar guidance to ensure that the IRS complies with taxpayer rights. In
I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3), Congress mandates that the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service ensure that IRS employees act in accord with the
taxpayer rights enumerated in that provision.139 However, it provides no
mechanism similar to the RFA or the PRA to guide IRS employees toward
accomplishment of the goal established by the statute.
Without more concrete guidance, the IRS lacks a systemic approach to
ensuring that its actions protect taxpayer rights. The IRS makes decisions in
writing regulatory and sub-regulatory guidance, producing forms, and
establishing internal guidance. In doing so, the IRS needs a procedural
framework for ensuring that its decisions undergo the same type of testing
with respect to taxpayer rights as they would in securing the protection of
small business or in reducing the paperwork burden. At present, these rights
exist as aspirational goals but without a mechanism for requiring the IRS to
assess the impact of its decisions on taxpayer rights. Using a rights-based
assessment system, the IRS could identify systemic administrative burden

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id. § 3507(j).
See id.
See id. § 3501.
See id. § 3501(8).
I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3).
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concerns expressed by Herd and Moynihan, as well as create a basis for the
sludge audits suggested by Sunstein.140
What do we mean by a rights-based analysis? As noted earlier, I.R.C. §
7803(a)(3) requires the Commissioner to ensure “that employees of the
Internal Revenue Service are familiar with and act in accord with taxpayer
rights as afforded by other provisions of this title” with respect to all the
rights afforded taxpayers in title 26 of the Code, including
(A) the right to be informed,
(B) the right to quality service,
(C) the right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax,
(D) the right to challenge the position of the Internal Revenue
Service and be heard,
(E) the right to appeal a decision of the Internal Revenue
Service in an independent forum,
(F) the right to finality,
(G) the right to privacy,
(H) the right to confidentiality,

140. In addition to looking at the RFA and the PRA as models for requiring decisions to
consider taxpayer rights, another system that could be analyzed is the statutory structure for
allowing agencies to charge user fees. See 31 U.S.C. § 9701. This statute sets up a scheme in
a setting where cost-benefit analysis collides with administrative burden. Id. Federal
agencies may establish user fees at “full cost” for services that convey a “special benefit” to
a specific recipient. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR NO. A-25 REVISED: MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND
ESTABLISHMENTS: USER CHARGES pt. 6.a (2017) [hereinafter OMB USER CHARGES], https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Circular-025.pdf. The fee must reflect
the value of the service to the recipient while being fair. 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(1), (b)(2)(B).
This system is based, in part, on the specific public policy or interest served. See id. §
9701(b)(C); OMB USER CHARGES, supra, at pt. 6. However, agencies can request a waiver
from the full cost requirement from the OMB. Id. at pt. 6.c. Agencies must also update their
fees every two years. T.D. 9820, 2017-32 I.R.B. 178. As with RFA and PRA, the IRS may
not always make an appropriate biennial assessment but must make one that allows an
analysis of the factors set out in the statute. See id.; 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b). In proposing new
fees, the IRS requires its business units to consider the “[e]ffect of the user fee on lowincome taxpayers,” the effect “on voluntary compliance, taxpayer burden, and taxpayer
rights,” and the “[e]xpected change in demand for the service resulting from the proposed
fee.” IRM 1.35.19.15(2)(d)–(f) (Nov. 8, 2012). Thus, if applied correctly, potential user fees
identified by the IRS should incorporate an administrative burden analysis, and if that
analysis shows the administrative burden to be excessive, the user fee should not be
proposed.
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(I) the right to retain representation, and
(J) the right to a fair and just tax system.141
There has been, and will continue to be, litigation about the remedies
available to taxpayers under this section.142 But at a minimum, these ten
rights, along with the explanatory language for each right set out in
Publication 1 of the IRS’s explanatory document Your Rights as a
Taxpayer, afford a basis for analyzing whether the IRS’s actions create an
unacceptable risk that these principles or specific statutory protections will
be violated.143 By incorporating this analysis into the administrative-burden
framework proposed by this Article, IRS employees will be required to
identify and address those risks prior to implementing an initiative, as well
as to periodically identify and address those risks throughout the initiative’s
implementation.144
The order of the ten taxpayer rights in I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) provides a
road map for such analysis. For example, the first right, the right to be
informed embraces the fundamental principle of due process that the
government must provide notice of its actions to affected persons. Thus, if
the IRS is to hold taxpayers accountable, it must inform taxpayers what it
expects them to do, the manner in which they should do it, and the
timeframe within which it expects them to do it. The manner in which the
IRS informs taxpayers of its expectations implicates the second right, the
141. I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3).
142. See generally Leandra Lederman, Is the Taxpayer Bill of Rights Enforceable? (Ind.
Univ. Maurer Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 404, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365777 (concluding that there is no cause of action for violations
of the statutory rights); Fogg, Can the TBOR Assist?, supra note 14 (discussing several cases
in which parties have sought relief based on the Taxpayer Bill of Rights); Alice G. Abreu &
Richard K. Greenstein, The U.S. Taxpayer Bill of Rights: Window Dressing or Expression of
Justice?, 4 J. TAX ADMIN. 25 (2018) (discussing normative remedies available for violations
of taxpayer rights).
143. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 1, YOUR RIGHTS AS A TAXPAYER
(rev. 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf [hereinafter IRS PUBLICATION 1]. In
Taxpayer Bill of Rights I, Congress required the IRS to prepare a statement of taxpayer
rights and IRS obligations and distribute it to taxpayers when contacting them regarding the
determination of tax or collection of tax. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6227, 102 Stat. 3342, 3731 (Nov. 10, 1988). Publication 1 fulfills
that requirement. See generally IRS PUBLICATION 1, supra.
144. For a proposal that focuses on rulemaking under the APA as a way to operationalize
taxpayer rights, requiring the IRS to consider the impact of proposed regulations and
subregulatory guidance on taxpayer rights, see Book, Giving Taxpayer Rights a Seat, supra
note 14.
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right to quality service. If the IRS informs taxpayers of its expectations in
vague, obscure, or even contradictory language, or via a communication
channel that is inaccessible or presents challenges to the affected taxpayer
population, the IRS has violated these two rights.145 A similar violation
occurs where the IRS issues notices that are dense, complex, or
misleading.146 Moreover, if the IRS fails to establish timely and accessible
processes for taxpayers to obtain clarification about its expectations,
including processes that are designed to meet the needs of the specific
taxpayer population impacted by the government action, these rights are
violated.147 Thus, a rights-based administrative burden analysis requires the
IRS to outline the education, outreach, communication, and taxpayer
service requirements for the proposed initiative.
Designing initiatives that comport with the right to be informed and the
right to quality service is a prerequisite to taxpayers exercising other rights,
including their right to challenge the IRS and be heard. Taxpayers cannot
raise their objections to the IRS’s actions if they do not know the basis for
that action and cannot reach the agency to discuss the matter. This right
must be satisfied if taxpayers’ right to pay no more than the correct amount
of tax is not to be undermined. Closely related is the right to appeal an IRS
decision to an independent forum. The explanatory language in Publication
1 makes clear that the independent forum not only encompasses judicial
review, but also the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.148 Initiatives that
145. See infra Section V.A for a discussion of how the IRS’s timing and manner of
notifying Social Security recipients about their deadline for informing the IRS about eligible
dependents for economic impact payments violated the right to be informed.
146. See, e.g., Keith Fogg, Misleading Taxpayers with Collection Letter, PROCEDURALLY
TAXING (Dec. 2, 2016), https://procedurallytaxing.com/misleading-taxpayers-with-collec
tion-letter/.
147. The IRS already struggles to provide accessibility to taxpayers. During the 2021
filing season, the IRS received over 167 million calls on all its lines, up 294% from 2018;
only 15.67 million of those calls reached a live assistor. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC.,
OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2022, at 9 (2021) [hereinafter OBJECTIVES
REPORT 2022], https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/JRC22_
FullReport.pdf. On the Form 1040 phone line, which is the main phone number for
individual income tax assistance, the IRS received approximately eighty-five million calls,
up 978% from the 2018 filing season, with only 3% reaching a live assistor. Id.
148. See IRS PUBLICATION 1, supra note 143. Prior to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, courts
had held that the right to an administrative appeal before the IRS was discretionary. See
Luhring v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 560, 565 (4th Cir. 1962). That has not changed following the
codification of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. Facebook, Inc. v. IRS, No. 17-cv-06490-LB,
2018 WL 2215743, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018). However, the official IRS explanation
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do not properly inform taxpayers in clear, prominent language of their right
to an administrative appeal or to judicial review, and of the time frame and
manner of making an appeal, violate this right. A rights-based
administrative burden analysis would require the proposed initiative to
identify the appeal rights implicated and to describe the communication
strategy, materials, notices, and employee training required to protect that
right.
The right to privacy and the right to a fair and just tax system both
specifically relate to how the IRS designs and implements its compliance
and enforcement initiatives. The right to privacy requires such initiatives to
incorporate the principle of proportionality—that the IRS’s actions will “be
no more intrusive than necessary.”149 The right to a fair and just tax system
requires the IRS to consider how taxpayers’ facts and circumstances affect
their liability for tax, their ability to pay, or their ability to provide
information in a timely manner.150 Under a rights-based analysis of
enforcement initiatives, the IRS must ensure that the information requested
and the data utilized are purposeful and strictly necessary for the
investigation, that the proposed sanctions are proportional to the
noncompliant activity proposed to be addressed, and that taxpayers have the
opportunity to raise their specific relevant circumstances (cf. the right to
challenge the IRS and be heard).151 Finally, the IRS must ensure that
taxpayers experiencing (or at risk of experiencing) significant hardship are
informed of their right to seek assistance from the Taxpayer Advocate
Service.152 Failure to meet any of these requirements violates these two
rights.153
of the right to appeal an IRS decision in an independent forum does not take such a narrow
view as the courts: “Taxpayers are entitled to a fair and impartial administrative appeal of
most IRS decisions, including many penalties, and have the right to receive a written
response regarding the Office of Appeals’ decision. Taxpayers generally have the right to
take their cases to court.” IRS PUBLICATION 1, supra note 143. Although the language
acknowledges both a general right to an administrative appeal and to judicial review,
Congress recently clarified taxpayers’ access to independent administrative appeals in the
Taxpayer First Act and mandated notice, written explanation, and administrative review
when access to an administrative appeal is denied. See Taxpayer First Act of 2019, Pub. L.
No. 116-25, § 1001, 133 Stat. 981, 983–84 (2019).
149. IRS PUBLICATION 1, supra note 143.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. I.R.C. § 7811 authorizes the NTA to issue a Taxpayer Assistance Order when the
taxpayer is experiencing, or about to experience, a significant hardship as a result of an IRS
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As discussed above,154 there is a heightened risk of excessive
administrative burden where procedures disproportionately affect
underrepresented populations. Thus, proposed or existing IRS initiatives
that affect these populations must satisfy the right to retain representation
by ensuring that IRS employees inform taxpayers that they have the right to
seek pro bono assistance from Low Income Taxpayer Clinics (“LITCs”)
and provide taxpayers with the contact information of LITCs that serve
their geographic area.155 The procedures must also direct employees to
allow time for these taxpayers to contact the LITCs before taking adverse
actions that would create significant hardship.
With respect to each of the rights articulated in the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights, there are scores, if not hundreds, of statutory and administrative
protections that align with each of the individual rights articulated in the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights. In fact, in 2011 the NTA published a “crosswalk”
of existing statutes and administrative procedures that give effect to the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights’ protections.156 As part of a rights-based
administrative-burden analysis, IRS employees can research that crosswalk
to identify the specific protections that must be available and design the
initiative so that these protections are available and accessible to taxpayers,
that taxpayers are sufficiently informed about them, and that IRS
employees are properly trained to provide and respect these protections.
In the following Part, we provide concrete steps to ensure that the IRS
acts consistently with identifying and reducing burdens that may have an
adverse impact on taxpayer rights. These steps build upon procedures that
action (or inaction). I.R.S. § 7811(a). Significant hardship “means a serious privation caused
or about to be caused to the taxpayer as the result of the particular manner in which the
revenue laws are being administered by the IRS.” Treas. Reg. 301.7811-1(a)(4)(ii) (as
amended in 2020).
153. One consequence of the violation would be that, having identified such a violation
as part of the Taxpayer Rights Impact Statements (“TRIS”) process, the IRS must either
remedy that violation or not move forward with the program, just as with a privacy right
violation identified via the PIA process.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 26–30.
155. I.R.C. § 7803(c)(6) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to specifically inform
taxpayers about the existence of, and contact information for, LITCs that serve the
taxpayers’ locale. See Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1402, 133 Stat. 981, 997
(2019). Prior to the Taxpayer First Act of 2019, IRS employees could only provide taxpayers
with the link to the LITC list on the website.
156. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS app. 1, at 513–18
(2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/irs_tas_arc_2011_vol_1.pdf.
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are familiar to, and integrated with, IRS internal administration, but the
rights-based analysis required under these procedures ensures that the IRS
will consider taxpayer rights up-front and throughout its design of
initiatives. It also creates a workable system for measuring burdens in the
context of rights.
IV. How a Taxpayer Rights Impact Statement Can Identify
and Facilitate Removing Excessive Burdens
In this Part, we propose a way to ensure that the IRS displays a greater
sensitivity to taxpayer rights, as well as describe how its actions or
inactions may contribute to a tax system that creates or fails to remove
administrative burdens that impinge on those rights. Building on elements
present in the Privacy Act and the Privacy Impact Assessment, we propose
that the IRS systematically consider taxpayer rights and issue Taxpayer
Rights Impact Statements (“TRIS”). By conducting a systematic review of
the impact of its actions on taxpayer rights and burdens through the TRIS
process, our approach highlights taxpayer rights and shifts taxpayer
experiences to the forefront of tax administration.
Before addressing the mechanics of a TRIS, it is worth noting that one
objection might be that, at times, the IRS has not complied with other
legislative provisions meant to provide oversight against improper or
burdensome actions, such as the APA,157 the privacy provisions,158 the
157. See, e.g., Kristen E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008); Kristen E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines:
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking
Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007).
158. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2017-30075, FISCAL YEAR 2017 STATUTORY REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/2017300
75fr.pdf (finding that the IRS had violated the rights of some taxpayers by not properly
disclosing all of the information that should have been made available to them); TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2019-20-062, SOME COMPONENTS OF THE
PRIVACY PROGRAM ARE EFFECTIVE; HOWEVER, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED (2019),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2019reports/201920062fr.pdf (reviewing privacy
impact statements and finding some were not updated timely but not criticizing the impact
statements themselves and also finding IRS employees were not receiving mandatory
privacy awareness training); TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO.
2020-10-038, FISCAL YEAR 2020 MANDATORY REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT (2020), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2020reports/
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PRA,159 or the RFA.160 In addition to the importance of compliance with the
procedural requirements, the timing of the compliance is also important.161
What good will another set of procedural requirements be if the IRS ignores
them either in letter or spirit?
As we discuss below, we believe that placement of the design and
oversight of the TRIS with the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate would
allow the NTA to report to Congress when the IRS fails to engage
meaningfully with the process. NTA reports have spurred congressional
action and oversight in the past, showing that Congress does read and react
to reports from the NTA.162 It could also lead a court to conclude that the
202010038fr.pdf (finding, similar to 2017, that the IRS did not properly disclose all of the
information it should have disclosed).
159. See, e.g., GAO, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT, supra note 13; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-974T, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT; INCREASE IN
ESTIMATED BURDEN HOURS HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR NEW APPROACH (2006), https://www.gao.
gov/assets/gao-06-974t.pdf.
160. In a Government Accountability Office review of 200 tax regulations issued from
2013 to 2015, only two regulations contained preambles that included an RFA analysis. U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES: TREASURY AND OMB
NEED TO REEVALUATE LONG-STANDING EXEMPTIONS OF TAX REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE
22 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-720.pdf. In approximately half of the
regulations reviewed by the Government Accountability Officer, the Treasury and the IRS
claimed that the “RFA’s requirements for a regulatory impact analysis did not apply because
the regulation does not impose a collection of information requirement on small entities.” Id.
161. The IRS has been criticized for the length of time PIAs take to review. Although
PIAs are required to be updated every three years, the lengthy process and lack of controls
results in untimely updates. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO.
2019-20-062, SOME COMPONENTS OF THE PRIVACY PROGRAM ARE EFFECTIVE; HOWEVER,
IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED (2019), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2019
reports/201920062_oa_highlights.html (finding that at end of Fiscal Year 2018, 37 (21%) of
the 173 assessments due to expire were not updated timely). Placing the review with the
NTA would mean the review has systemic urgency. Creating timeframes for all parties’
responses and the procedures for resolving disputes could reduce the review and update
period.
162. See Highlights of the Taxpayer First Act and Its Impact on TAS and Taxpayer
Rights, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/
news/ntablog-highlights-of-the-taxpayer-first-act-and-its-impact-on-tas-and-taxpayer-rights/
(listing the twenty-six legislative recommendations made by TAS that Congress included in
the Taxpayer First Act and discussing several codified provisions—such as the provisions
codifying the authority of the Taxpayer Advocate Directive and requiring coordination with
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration—that strengthen the ability of TAS
to accomplish changes within the IRS); see also NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2020 PURPLE
BOOK app. 2, at 119–23 (2019), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/
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IRS’s failure to adequately comply with the TRIS process creates an
opportunity for review under the APA.163 In sum, the proposal’s design
assumes significant internal agency oversight backstopped by the
possibility of direct legislative and judicial oversight.
We recommend the IRS conduct the TRIS with respect to all prospective
programs. Additionally, we propose a method for systematic review of
existing programs. The term “program” becomes significant in identifying
which actions the IRS takes or has taken that require review through the
TRIS procedure. We use the term “program” to retain maximum flexibility
for applying this analysis.164 This term encompasses both broad categories
of processes, e.g., the offer in compromise program and specific initiatives,
such as the use of chatbots in the online installment agreement application.
Prospectively, we contemplate the term to cover IRS-proposed initiatives,
procedures, and systems relating to taxpayer service, compliance, and
enforcement activities that have a taxpayer-facing component. As noted
elsewhere,165 for existing programs, we believe the NTA can designate
programs of such impact that they warrant an administrative
burden/taxpayer rights analysis. To the extent there is disagreement
between the Taxpayer Advocate Service and other functions within the IRS,
we recommend that the NTA report directly to Congress if it has identified
2020/08/ARC19_PurpleBook.pdf (listing the NTA legislative recommendations enacted by
Congress in whole or in part).
163. See Book, Giving Taxpayer Rights a Seat, supra note 14, at 781 (proposing that the
IRS’s failure to consider the impact of its rulemaking on taxpayer rights should lead a court
to conclude that the agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious under the APA standard at 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
For a similar legislative proposal in the context of requiring agencies to publish disparate
impact assessments, see Cristina Isabel Ceballos et al., Disparate Limbo: How
Administrative Law Erased Antidiscrimination, 131 YALE L.J. 370, 456 (2021) (noting that
an agency’s failure to publish the impact statement might be actionable under the APA).
164. To assist with this, our illustrative examples at the beginning of this Article present
scenarios where IRS action or inaction would amount to programs that require review under
the TRIS procedure. See supra Part I.
We prefer an approach that is standard based and illustrative, mindful that in analogous
areas in administrative law there has been significant uncertainty concerning the precise
nature of agency action. See generally Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance
Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 265 (2018) (noting that whether federal agencies can
rely on the interpretive and policymaking exceptions to notice-and-comment requirements as
rules may constitute “the single most frequently litigated and important issue of rulemaking
procedure before the federal courts today”).
165. See infra Section IV.B.
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IRS actions that, in its discretion, should generate a TRIS and the
Commissioner were to disagree.166
The framework and approach discussed above accomplishes several
things. First, it requires the IRS, before programs are implemented, to (1)
identify under-resourced populations that are affected by its actions; (2)
articulate how the design of agency programs may undermine taxpayer
protections or access to benefits, based on the specific characteristics of the
taxpayer segment; and (3) make recommendations to mitigate those
burdens. Second, it requires that the IRS’s assessment (the TRIS and the
related questionnaire, outlined below) is posted on the agency’s website so
that the public, Congress, and IRS oversight agencies can see how the IRS
is conducting the rights-based administrative burden framework. This
transparency will enable stakeholders to raise concerns where the analysis
provided by the IRS has fallen short, and it provides an important tool to
conduct ongoing oversight of the agency. Third, and most important, it is
the first step in driving a culture change in the agency, where it recognizes
its dual mission as both a revenue collector and a social benefits
administrator.167 The framework analysis will require the IRS to establish
166. As a model for this approach, we note that in the Taxpayer First Act, Congress
codified and enhanced the Taxpayer Advocate Directives authority by requiring the NTA to
report to Congress any Taxpayer Advocate Directives that the IRS failed to timely honor.
Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1301(a)(2), 133 Stat. 981, 991 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B)(ii)(VIII)). The Commissioner had previously given
the NTA authority to mandate administrative or procedural changes “to improve the
operation of a functional process or to grant relief to groups of taxpayers (or all taxpayers)
when implementation will protect the rights of taxpayers, prevent undue burden, ensure
equitable treatment or provide an essential service to taxpayers.” I.R.S. Deleg. Order 13-3
(Rev. 1), IRM 1.2.2.12.3 (Jan. 17, 2001).
167. See generally 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 16–
17, 26 (2010) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2010], https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/2010arcms
p2_irsmission.pdf (arguing the IRS mission statement does not reflect the agency’s
increasing responsibilities for administering social benefit programs and recommending that
the mission statement, strategic objectives, and performance measures be revised to reflect
these responsibilities); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT 4–7 (2019) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS],
https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/JRC20_Volume3_Final.
pdf (recommending the IRS amend its mission statement to reflect its dual missions of
collecting revenue and disbursing social benefits); Nina Olson, Thinking Out Loud About the
Advanced Child Tax Credit – Part 3: The Family and Worker Benefit Unit, PROCEDURALLY
TAXING (July 1, 2021), https://procedurallytaxing.com/thinking-out-loud-about-the-advanc
ed-child-tax-credit-part-3-the-family-and-worker-benefit-unit/ (proposing the establishment
of a dedicated IRS division charged with administering all aspects of family and worker tax
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new measures of program success, which in turn will require the agencies
auditing its performance to shift their audit focus of these programs solely
from measures of revenue collected to measures of taxpayer burden and
rights impaired.
Why has a taxpayer-focused perspective been lacking? Tax policy
proposals are generally assessed on the bases of efficiency, equity, and
administrability.168 Administrability is often overlooked, and when it is
considered, it is from the perspective of the tax agency—whether the
agency has the resources to adequately administer the policy initiative.
Rarely do policy debates consider the taxpayer’s administrative burden. Yet
placing an excessive administrative burden on the taxpayer population that
the policy seeks to benefit provides a sure path to failure. This is
particularly true for programs benefiting taxpayer populations that are
literacy challenged—whether financial, digital, or functional—or that do
not have access to representation.
Traditional cost-benefit analysis also underestimates the weight of
administrative burden from the taxpayer/beneficiary’s perspective. By
focusing solely on the government’s costs and the monetary compliance
costs of the taxpayer/beneficiary, this analysis ignores the learning and
psychological costs identified by Herd and Moynihan.169 Moreover,
excessive administrative burden can negatively impact taxpayers’ ability to
exercise taxpayer rights, which, in turn, can increase perceptions of the
illegitimate use of agency power, thereby decreasing voluntary
compliance.170
provisions administered through the Internal Revenue Code). But see Kristin E. Hickman,
Pursuing a Single Mission (or Something Closer to It) for the IRS, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 169,
173 (2016) (recommending that, in light of the non-revenue functions the IRS has been
charged with performing, Congress should consider “spinning off” non-revenue-raising
programs from IRS oversight or splitting up the IRS altogether and distributing its many
functions among other new or existing agencies).
168. See generally James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA.
TAX REV. 135, 136 (2012) (“[Horizontal equity] in our tax system has generally been
thought to require that individuals with the same income should pay the same tax. [Vertical
equity] has generally been thought to require a progressive rate structure that imposes
progressively higher rates on individuals with higher incomes.”); JOEL SLEMROD & JON
BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES (5th ed. 2017).
169. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 47, at 2.
170. Katharina Gangl et al., Tax Authorities’ Interaction with Taxpayers: A Conception
of Compliance in Social Dilemmas by Power and Trust, 37 NEW IDEAS PSYCH. 13 (2015)
(conceptualizing the distinctions between coercive and legitimate power with reason-based
and implicit trust). See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
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Our proposed rights-based framework acknowledges that where there is
evidence of broad-based, systemic noncompliance, developing programs
that increase upfront administrative burdens on taxpayers to facilitate
downstream compliance may be justified to protect program integrity (and
even enable continuation of the program). However, even for a program
with a superficially large monetary impact, but where the incidence of
noncompliance occurs within a small percentage of taxpayers, the problem
may not justify a solution that imposes a disproportionate administrative
burden on all taxpayers or a large group of individuals.
The IRS has historically measured burden with respect to the act of tax
return filing—an approach reinforced by the Paperwork Reduction Act,
which measures the cost of filing compliance.171 This approach ignores
other types of costs and other types of burdens, such as downstream
burdens including audits, summary assessments, and collection actions.172
Further, by focusing solely on the act of filing a tax return, the historical
approach ignores the burden of the IRS’s increasing use of post-filing
compliance action as part of the filing process.173 The NTA has reported
that during the 2020 filing season, the IRS “refund fraud filters selected
over 3.2 million refund returns, a 107 percent increase over the 2019 filing
season.”174 Of those returns, approximately sixty-six percent were false
positives.175 That is, two-thirds of the refund returns that IRS systems
labeled as potentially fraudulent turned out to be legitimate. About twenty171. See supra Section III.A.3.
172. See generally supra Section II.B.
173. For example, taxpayers whose claims for certain tax credits were denied in a
previous year must file IRS Form 8862, Information to Claim Certain Credits After
Disallowance, in order to receive the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, the
Additional Child Tax Credit, the American Opportunity Tax Credit, the Credit for Other
Dependents, or Head of Household filing status in a following year. See IRM 21.6.3.5 (Oct.
29, 2020); IRM 4.19.14.7. (Mar. 12, 2021). These returns are then manually reviewed before
processing the returns and issuing refunds. For a visual representation of the return filing and
controversy roadmap, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 5341, THE TAXPAYER
ROADMAP (rev. 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5341.pdf.
174. ANNUAL REPORT 2020, supra note 16, at 230. The Pre-Refund Wage Verification
Program, a component of the Return Review Program and administered by the Return
Integrity Verification Operation (“RIVO”), freezes returns claiming refunds while the IRS
attempts to verify wages and withholding claimed on the return. See id. RIVO utilizes “an
obsolete case management and screening system called Return Review Program Legacy
Component (or Electronic Fraud Detection System), which the IRS has been planning to
replace for more than a decade.” Id. at 156.
175. Id. at 151 n.19.
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five percent of the returns that the IRS froze as potentially fraudulent took
longer than fifty-six days to be unfrozen and released for processing and
appropriate refund issuance.176 While some of the delay may be attributable
to closures during the pandemic, this high false-positive rate associated
with non-identity theft refund fraud filters has persisted for years—
including seventy-two percent for the 2019 filing season.177 Traditional
cost-benefit analysis, the PRA, and the Privacy Act all fail to measure the
administrative burden to taxpayers whose refunds were delayed by these
post-filing actions.178
A. Taxpayer Rights Impact Statement Publication Process
Below is a high-level description of the stages leading to the publication
of the proposed Taxpayer Rights Impact Statement.
Step 1: Description of Program/Proposal: Here, the IRS describes what
it is doing or proposing to do, and what it hopes to achieve by
implementing the initiative both from a narrow tax administration
perspective and from a broader public policy one. The agency must identify
the statutory authority for the initiative, the public policy purpose for the
statute, and how the initiative achieves the underlying public policy goals in
carrying out the agency’s mission.
Step 2: Program Flow Analysis: Borrowing the term and the concept
from the PIA, the process requires that the IRS next map out the actual
program proposal: what, specifically, are the actions it is planning to take;
by whom will the program be administered and with what group of
employees; what training will the employees receive; what customer
assistance will be provided, how and by whom; what new notices will be
developed; what are the current procedures and how will the IRS modify
176. Id. at 231. Roughly 18% took longer than 120 days for refund issuance. Id.
177. Id. at 151.
178. These numbers are significant and place a heavy burden on those involved in tax
return filing—particularly those at the lower end claiming refundable credits and other
similar programs for which the IRS has developed return processing filters. For example, in
FY 2020, the IRS issued 98,562 math error notices summarily adjusting claims for the
Earned Income Tax Credit. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 2020, at 34, 55 (2021),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf (reporting 74,936 notices for tax year 2019 returns
processed in FY 2020 and 23,626 notices for tax year 2018 and other prior-year returns).
The NTA reports that as of May 22, 2021—the end of the 2021 filing season—the IRS had
suspended returns processing of 10.3 million returns for error resolution and 2.1 million for
identity theft. OBJECTIVES REPORT 2022, supra note 147, at iv–v.
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those procedures; and how does the IRS propose to communicate the
program and its requirements to the taxpayers? The analysis will also
identify those agency divisions and functions that are affected either
upstream or downstream by the program/proposal.
Step 3: Identification and Analysis of Impacted Population: The IRS
identifies the segments of the taxpayer population affected by the
program/proposal. This stage consists of a distributional analysis of
taxpayers impacted, including demographic characteristics. Based on this
analysis, the agency will identify whether the program disproportionately
and unnecessarily impacts a specific taxpayer segment. At this stage, we are
not defining a specific group of protected taxpayers. Instead, the goal is
protecting taxpayer rights to be universal and potentially include all
taxpayers before narrowing to those disproportionately impacted and who
might be considered especially vulnerable to harm due to the presence of
compliance, learning, and/or psychological costs (administrative burdens as
per Herd and Moynihan).
Step 4: Impacted Taxpayer Segment Analysis: The IRS analyzes the
characteristics of the impacted taxpayer segments, with a focus on
identifying vulnerable taxpayers, that is, segments that include disabled,
low-income, and underrepresented taxpayers. The analysis should identify
the specific characteristics of the impacted taxpayer segment that might
increase the risk of excessive administrative burden.
Step 5: Taxpayer Rights/Administrative Burden Analysis: Having
identified the impacted taxpayer segment’s specific characteristics that
increase the risk of excessive administrative burden, the next step is to
conduct a taxpayer-rights and administrative-burden analysis of the
program/proposal with respect to that taxpayer segment. Here, the agency
identifies the specific administrative burdens present in the program that
pose challenges to the population and how those burdens, left unaddressed,
will impair specific taxpayer rights, as afforded by the Internal Revenue
Code or as listed in I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3). Doing this may require pilot
programs or studies to evaluate the actual impact and to measure burdens.
Where the analysis identifies an impaired taxpayer protection, including
creating excessive administrative barriers to accessing a tax credit,
deduction, or benefit, the analysis will identify mitigation strategies to
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reduce or eliminate the excessive administrative burden.179 The completed
Taxpayer Rights/Administrative Burden Analysis will be circulated to all
entities identified in the questionnaire as having upstream and downstream
impact for comment and recommendations. Such recommendations will be
noted in the analysis and identified as to the source of the recommendation
and whether the recommendation was adopted. Where the program owner
does not adopt the recommendation, the program owner must provide a
written explanation of its reasons and how it otherwise plans to address the
concern raised.
Step 6: Taxpayer Rights Impact Statement: Upon completion of the
Taxpayer Rights/Administrative Burden Analysis, the program owner
prepares a Taxpayer Rights Impact Statement, which documents the
taxpayer rights/administrative burden risks and potential implications to the
protected taxpayer segment, describes the concerns raised through the
circulation process, and discusses the mitigations proposed to lessen or
eliminate those burdens. The TRIS contains all the information that senior
agency leaders need to determine whether to proceed with the program, or
whether the program should be paused or modified. The TRIS also provides
a basis for monitoring the program going forward. As with the PIA, if the
agency moves forward with the program, the agency publishes the TRIS on
the dedicated webpage of the agency website. The TRIS will enable entities
charged with oversight, including the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, the Treasury Inspector General Tax Administration, the Taxpayer
Advocate Service, and Congress, to assess the actual implementation of the
program in terms of taxpayer rights and administrative burden.
B. Issues and Challenges Relating to the TRIS Framework
The rights-based administrative burden framework requires the IRS to
expand its horizons and think more holistically about how it interacts with
taxpayers. It focuses on the relationship between the IRS and the taxpayer,
and it considers the distributional impact of the burdens it imposes,
179. We recommend that the IRS place the IRM section creating the analytical
framework under the chapter of the IRM setting out responsibilities for the NTA (IRM
Chapter 13). The NTA would determine the procedures relating to the TRIS development
and ensure different viewpoints are considered. Because the NTA is charged with protection
of taxpayer rights by statute and operates independently of other IRS divisions, they can play
this role in managing the process while the Service is responsible for posting the TRIS on its
website—that is, the IRS has ownership of the final product, but the NTA has ownership of
the process.
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minimizing the risk that the IRS’s actions are arbitrary.180 The rights-based
framework, however, applies beyond agency actions governed by the
APA181 and is not limited to agency rules, nor does it necessarily connect
with judicial rights. The framework requires the agency to temper its costbenefit analysis by recognizing that cost-benefit analysis is insufficient
where other considerations and organic statutes—such as the taxpayer bill
of rights—are involved, and where rights play a distributional role. Thus,
the critical questions are, did the IRS consider taxpayer rights in taking this
action? And is the IRS ignoring taxpayer rights by not taking an action?
Our approach applies at earlier stages of the IRS’s decision-making
process than the APA-driven concept of final agency action.182 Finality
itself is ambiguous, as demonstrated in Scholl v. Mnuchin, where the court
found that the IRS’s use of FAQs to deny an advance refund represented
final agency action.183 Instead, this Article proposes a test that requires
approaching decisions from the perspective of the taxpayer. Finality under
this analysis occurs if an agency action deters or dissuades someone from
getting access to a benefit even if, from the agency perspective, it may not
technically be final under the APA definition.184
Step 3 of our proposed framework squarely presents the challenge of
describing and identifying the taxpayer populations that are affected by
excessive administrative burden. As noted above, we identify burdens as
excessive where (1) the burden falls primarily on a subset of taxpayers who
are disabled, low income, or otherwise underrepresented, and (2) when
burdens directly impair the taxpayer rights provided in the Internal Revenue
Code as codified in I.R.C. § 7803(a). This approach assists all taxpayers
impacted by IRS programs and decisions; however, in any specific situation
the impact may fall on a particular subset of taxpayers. For example, the
IRS’s implementation of identity-theft assistance impacts high/medium/
180. A decision to deny stimulus payments to incarcerated individuals despite the
language and history of the legislation provides a recent example of a decision by the IRS
that appears arbitrary. See Scholl v. Mnuchin, 489 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1031–37 (N.D. Cal.
2020).
181. See generally Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
182. See generally Beau J. Baumann & Greg Mina, Note, Clowning Around with Final
Agency Action, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329 (2018).
183. See Scholl, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 1028; see also Book, Tax Administration and Racial
Justice, supra note 53, at 697.
184. See generally Baumann & Mina, supra note 182 (noting courts’ struggle to interpret
the APA’s “final agency action” under 5 U.S.C. § 704).
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low-income taxpayers because anyone can fall victim to this fraud. On the
other hand, our approach requires an analysis for a particular subset of
taxpayers where they are disproportionately impacted by the agency’s
program. If the agency is doing something that affects 75% to 100% of
overseas taxpayers but not domestic taxpayers, the overall program may
appear appropriate, yet it has a disproportionate impact on one subset of
taxpayers. For example, such a burden might occur if the IRS does not have
any toll-free overseas lines and does not allow email conversations. That
would create an excessive administrative burden given the characteristics of
the population of overseas taxpayers.185
As with section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002—requiring
agencies to conduct PIAs for electronic systems and collection of
information186—the scope of the TRIS is broad. We propose that the IRS
conduct a rights-based administrative burden assessment for customer
service and compliance programs and systems. We define compliance
programs and systems to include notices, refund claim freezes, automated
matching compliance programs, audits, collection actions, collection
alternatives, public filings of notices of federal tax liens, and passport
denials. Customer-service programs include (1) online self-service; (2)
automated and live telephone assistance; (3) in-person assistance; and (4)
outreach and education initiatives, including notices. At the outset, we
anticipate this analysis to be conducted on programs that operate across all
areas of the IRS. Where regional or local programs propose deviations from
the broader program approach, they will be required to conduct a similar
review.
Pursuant to the rights-based administrative framework, when the agency
proposes a new initiative, the program owner will complete the
questionnaire, described in Step 5 above, that assists the agency in
185. A similar issue arises with the availability of notices in languages other than English
and interpreter service. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (2000).
Executive Order 13166 requires federal agencies to examine the services they provide and
identify any need for services to those with limited English proficiency. Id. The IRS Office
of Equity, Diversity and Inclusion has addressed IRS efforts to comply with Executive Order
13166. See Language Access for Taxpayers with Limited English Proficiency: Frequently
Asked Questions, IRS (Jan. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/language-access-taxpay
ers-limited-english-proficiency-faqs.pdf. For more on the impact of language barriers and
taxpayer rights, see Jennifer J. Lee, Operationalizing Language Access Rights for Limited
English Proficient Taxpayers, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 791 (2019).
186. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921–23
(2002).
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identifying whether there is a significant likelihood that the program’s
administrative burden will deprive the protected taxpayer segment of a
fundamental taxpayer right, including undermining the program’s public
policy goal. The completed questionnaire will be circulated to appropriate
agency personnel, including the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate and the
Office of Chief Counsel, as well as operating divisions that are affected
both upstream and downstream by the program proposal. All comments
will be addressed by the program owner, with attendant internal discussions
as necessary.187 The Taxpayer Rights/Administrative Burden Analysis,
including the risks to fundamental taxpayer rights and discussions of
mitigations, will be documented in a TRIS that the IRS will post to its
dedicated webpage for public viewing.
As noted above, we recommend that oversight and coordination of the
use of TRIS as a tool be placed in the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate.188
By statute, the NTA is the voice of the taxpayer inside the IRS and is
charged with identifying administrative causes of taxpayer problems and
187. We envision a review process similar to the Internal Revenue Manual clearance
process described in IRM 1.11.9.2, whereby new or revised IRM sections are circulated to
internal entities that may be affected by such procedures. See generally IRM 1.11.9.2 (Apr.
17, 2020). IRM 1.11.9.4 describes procedures for obtaining specialized reviews, including
by the Office of Chief Counsel and the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate. See generally IRM
1.11.9.4.1 (Oct. 1, 2021); IRM 1.11.9.4.3 (Jan. 24, 2017).
188. Another option is placing TRIS oversight in the Office of Burden Reduction in the
Small Business/Self-Employed (“SBSE”) Operating Division. See generally IRM 1.1.16
(Mar. 15, 2022). We decided not to recommend that for two reasons. First, SBSE has
become the de facto enforcement arm of the IRS. Between 2004 and 2006, its outreach and
education function, Taxpayer Education and Communication, was eliminated, and between
2017 and 2018 its replacement, the Office of Stakeholder Liaison, was moved out of SBSE
and into the IRS headquarters Communications & Liaison Office. See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOC., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 175–78 (2006), https://www.taxpayeradvo
cate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2006_arc_vol_1_cover__section_1.pdf; 1 NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 244 (2019) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT 2018], https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ARC18_
Volume1.pdf. Thus, today SBSE has no organizational unit thinking about taxpayer rights
and service needs or about tax administration from the perspective of taxpayers. See id.
(“[T]here is no outreach function . . . within the SB/SE division.”). Second, the Office of
Taxpayer Burden Reduction is embedded deep within the management chain of SBSE. See
generally IRM 22.24.1.1 (Jan. 8, 2016). The NTA, on the other hand, is required by statute
to make a direct report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and must also report
annually directly to Congress. I.R.C. § 7803(c)(1)(B)(i), (c)(2)(B)(i). Thus, placement of
TRIS oversight in the Office of the NTA gives the program much greater gravitas and
transparency.
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making recommendations to mitigate those problems.189 As with the
Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure Office and the PIA, because
the NTA would have the final say in whether a TRIS protects important
taxpayer rights, the NTA would have the ability to stop a new program that
did not provide adequate taxpayer protection and would participate closely
in determining any necessary programmatic changes needed before
implementation. This approach aligns with the NTA’s systemic-advocacy
mission. Responsibility for legal analysis of a rights-based administrative
burden framework could fall under the position currently held by the
Counsel to the NTA.190
While we propose the agency adopt this approach for new programs and
initiatives, this analysis should also be applied to existing programs.
Because the scope of the IRS’s work and its impact on taxpayers is so
broad, we propose the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate play a key role in
identifying existing programs that would benefit from the taxpayer
rights/administrative burden framework. For example, in the Fiscal Year
Objectives Report to Congress issued in June each year,191 the NTA could
identify five existing programs that would benefit from the rights-based
administrative burden framework review, based on our criteria of protected
taxpayer segments. The IRS would be required to conduct that review over
the next fiscal year and, upon completion, post the TRIS to its website.
Oversight agencies could then conduct their own reviews of the analysis
and implementation.
V. An Application of Our Framework: The Taxpayer Rights
Impact Statement at Work
We started this Article presenting differing scenarios in which taxpayers
are required to navigate burdens. In this Part, we return to the first of our
189. I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2).
190. Although the attorney occupying that role is a Chief Counsel executive with a place
at the table of Chief Counsel, and IRS leadership, the individual has no programmatic voice.
See generally IRM 30.3.2.1.2 (Oct. 29, 2020). Their job involves providing advice to the
NTA but not necessarily advocating themselves for taxpayer rights as their counterparts
might do for programs within SBSE or the Large Business and International Division
(“LB&I”). See generally id. Placing the legal voice for TRIS with Counsel to the NTA
allows that attorney to have a clear voice to offer to the Chief Counsel who could weigh that
voice against the enforcement-oriented voices coming from counsel to SBSE and LB&I.
191. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Reports to Congress, https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.
gov/reports/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2022).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss4/3

2022]

REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS

577

scenarios and apply our framework as a means of demonstrating how it can
assist with the identification and removal of barriers that frustrate, and at
times deter, individuals from receiving needed benefits or escaping from
collection actions that can exacerbate financial hardship.192 We use the first
scenario, the delivery of emergency benefits, as a case study on how the
specific steps of the TRIS process can drive design improvements and
protect taxpayer rights:
In response to a once-in-a-century pandemic, Congress turns to the IRS
to deliver cash to Americans who are suffering unprecedented hardships.
Congress structures the benefits as a refundable credit, known as a
Recovery Rebate Credit (“RRC”), that can be claimed on a 2020 tax
return, but also directs the IRS to pay an equivalent amount known as an
economic impact payment (“EIP”). By January 2021, the IRS issues over
300 million EIPs to eligible individuals, totaling over $413 billion in
emergency financial relief. While most people receive money automatically,
the IRS lacks sufficient information on millions of Americans who did not
file tax returns. To distribute the full amount of EIPs, the IRS establishes a
non-filer portal for people to enter information for themselves and
dependents. For many federal beneficiaries who had not previously filed
tax returns, the IRS provides under two weeks to register to receive the full
benefits relating to dependents, thus preventing a Social Security disability
recipient from receiving assistance that was meant to help his family during
a crushing pandemic.
192. Although we highlight instances in which the IRS fails to act in a manner that best
protects taxpayer rights, we do not mean to suggest that it always does so. Some of the
programs and policies it has adopted would fit well as models for how to approach a
problem to reach a taxpayer-friendly result that does not burden tax administration. Without
going into significant detail, we suggest the relatively recent decision regarding the need to
issue a Form 1099-C resulting from disputed student loan debt provides a good example. See
Alex Johnson, IRS Moves to Prevent Defrauded Borrowers from Massively Overpaying
Taxes Through Adoption of a New Revenue Procedure, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Mar. 10,
2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/irs-moves-to-prevent-defrauded-borrowers-from-mass
ively-overpaying-taxes-through-adoption-of-a-new-revenue-procedure/. The decision to
streamline the method for fixing a failure to redeposit money into an IRA within sixty days
also demonstrates the IRS can adopt a taxpayer-friendly approach. See Karla Hunter, New
Rev Proc Waives Drastic Effect of 60-Day Retirement Account Rollover Failure,
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Sept. 16, 2016), https://procedurallytaxing.com/new-rev-procwaives-drastic-effect-of-60-day-retirement-account-rollover-failure/. In both instances the
IRS adopted an approach that benefited tax administration while saving taxpayers from a
difficult situation.
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A. Background
On March 27, 2020, in response to the spreading economic harm
attributable to the coronavirus pandemic, Congress passed, and the
President signed, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(“CARES”) Act.193 The Act provided for advance payments of a refundable
credit that could be claimed on eligible taxpayers’ 2020 federal income tax
returns.194 The advance payments, EIPs, were a mechanism for quickly
infusing cash into the hands of individuals and families struggling
economically as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.195 The IRS was
instructed to pay EIPs “as rapidly as possible.”196 The amount of the EIP
was based on a taxpayer’s filing status, qualifying children, and adjusted
gross income as reported on the taxpayer’s 2019 federal tax return.197
Because the pandemic hit in the middle of the annual filing season, many
taxpayers had not yet filed their 2019 returns, so Congress authorized the
IRS to use the 2018 return data where no 2019 return was on record.198
Further, because many taxpayers have no annual return filing requirement
at all—i.e., their incomes are below the filing threshold—Congress
instructed the IRS to work with other federal agencies to utilize data on file
to determine eligibility for the credit and, implicit in this directive, issue
payments automatically.199 Notwithstanding the IRS’s overall success in
delivering EIPs, as discussed below, this latter directive and the IRS’s
implementation thereof generated significant criticism of the IRS from

193. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134
Stat. 281.
194. See I.R.C. § 6428(a) (providing for an advance payment of the Rebate Recovery
Credit, a refundable credit that is claimed on the 2020 Individual Income Tax Return).
195. What to Know About the First Stimulus Check, TAX OUTREACH (Nov. 12, 2021),
https://www.taxoutreach.org/tax-filing/coronavirus/what-to-know-about-the-economic-imp
act-payments-stimulus-checks/.
196. I.R.C. § 6428(f)(3)(A).
197. Based on filing status and the existence of dependents, the amount of a taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income needed to fall below certain ceilings in order for the taxpayer to
benefit from the stimulus payment program. High income individuals were left out of the
program. Questions and Answers About the First Economic Impact Payment – Topic A:
Eligibility, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/questions-and-answers-about-the-first-econ
omic-impact-payment-topic-a-eligibility (Feb. 16, 2022).
198. I.R.C. § 6428(f)(5).
199. See id. § 6428(f)(5)(B).
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Congress, the media, and advocates, and resulted in major litigation.200 It
also illustrates how the agency’s failure to consider the impact of the
program’s administrative burden on vulnerable populations denied them
life-sustaining cash.
Through annual individual income tax return filings, the IRS receives a
vast trove of financial and family information for about 160 million
households.201 No other federal agency has this exact compilation of data.
Thus, it makes sense for Congress to turn to the IRS to deliver social
benefit programs that can be structured as tax credits, and since the 1990s,
Congress has increasingly done so.202 But this approach is not without
drawbacks, most significantly that these benefit programs are imposed upon
an agency that views itself as an enforcement agency with the primary goal
of revenue collection.203 The application for these benefits, made via the
income tax return, imposes relatively little burden on the
applicant/taxpayer, but post-application processes are notoriously
cumbersome and unfriendly for those taxpayers caught up in the IRS frauddetection and audit programs. Moreover, the return-processing system itself
is very inflexible and built on decades-old technology; planning for the next
200. Michelle Singletary, A Second $1,200 Stimulus Check Is Likely, but the IRS Still
Hasn’t Ironed Out All the Glitches from the First One, WASH. POST (July 27, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/27/second-irs-stimulus-check-payment/
(detailing how federal beneficiaries sued the Treasury and IRS for failing to deliver the $500
stimulus payment intended for individuals with dependent children); Advocate’s EIP Help
Called Lacking; McGruder Injunction Filed, TAX NOTES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.
taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/tax-system-administration/advocates-eip-help-calledlacking-mcgruder-injunction-filed/2020/08/03/2cshm (detailing the seeking of an injunction
against the IRS due to the agency’s creation of arbitrary deadlines for providing the
information to receive economic impact payments).
201. Filing Season Statistics for Week Ending December 27, 2019, IRS (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/filing-season-statistics-for-week-ending-december-27-2019
(publicizing that 155,798,000 returns were received in 2019 filing season).
202. The NTA has called on the IRS to adopt a mission statement that reflects the
increasing responsibilities the IRS has in administering social benefits programs. See
ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 167, at 16–17; see also Nina Olson, FAWBU and Dispute
Resolution Redux: A 12-Step Program for Culture Change at the IRS - Part 1,
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Oct. 28, 2021), https://procedurallytaxing.com/fawbu-and-disputeresolution-redux-a-12-step-program-for-culture-change-at-the-irs-part-1/ (proposing, as the
first step of a twelve-step program to bring cultural change to the IRS reflecting the IRS’s
responsibilities, that the agency adopt “a mission statement that explicitly recognizes the IRS
has a dual mission of collecting revenue and disbursing social benefits, framed by the duty to
protect taxpayer rights”).
203. See SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 167, at 5.
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year’s filing season begins with the opening of the current season, and lastminute changes must be adopted in such a way as to impose minimal risk to
the system.
It is in this context that the IRS approached EIP implementation. On
March 30, 2020, the IRS declared that all federal benefits recipients whose
incomes were below the filing threshold (non-filer federal benefits
recipients) had to file a 2019 income tax return to receive the EIP for
themselves and their qualifying children.204 This announcement generated a
considerable outcry.205 Two days later, the IRS reversed itself and declared
that recipients of Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits would
automatically receive their individual EIPs based on data matching.206 Later
announcements stated both Supplemental Security Income and certain
Veterans’ beneficiaries would also receive automated payments.207 For
those non-filers who were not federal benefits recipients, the IRS created an
online non-filer portal through which they could provide basic information
(name, mailing address, email address, social security number) as well as
information about their qualifying children.208
On April 20, 2020, the IRS announced through an online press release
that Social Security and Railroad Retirement beneficiaries would have to
enter their qualifying children into the online portal by noon on April 22,
2020, merely forty hours later, or else they would have to wait until the
2021 filing season to claim the children on a 2020 return and receive the

204. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-61, Economic Impact Payments:
What You Need to Know (Mar. 30, 2020), https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USIRS/
bulletins/2840af7 (original release).
205. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Margaret Wood Hassan et al. to Steven T. Mnuchin,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, and Andrew Saul, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Apr. 1,
2020), https://perma.cc/T3QH-TKLP.
206. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treas., Social Security Recipients Will Automatically
Receive Economic Impact Payments (Apr. 1, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm967; Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-61, Economic Impact
Payments: What You Need to Know (Apr. 1, 2020) (updated release).
207. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-73, Supplemental Security Income
Recipients Will Receive Automatic Economic Impact Payments (Apr. 15, 2020); Press
Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-75, Veterans Affairs Recipients Will Receive
Automatic Economic Impact Payments (Apr. 17, 2020).
208. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-69, Treasury, IRS Launch New Tool
to Help Non-Filers Register for Economic Impact Payments (Apr. 10, 2020).
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relevant RRC.209 This demand prompted yet another outcry from Congress,
tax professionals, and benefits advocates. Eight senators wrote to the IRS,
estimating that one million otherwise qualifying children would be
harmed;210 advocates noted that the normal safety net of Volunteer Tax
Assistance sites and Tax Counseling for the Elderly programs were
effectively shut down because of the pandemic, as were the traditional
support systems for elderly and disabled individuals, especially those who
are low income.211 The IRS itself had suspended all telephone and in-person
assistance on May 11, 2020.212
The IRS doubled down on its position, even after the Government
Accountability Office found that the IRS had failed to pay dependent EIPs
to approximately 450,000 individuals who had registered their qualifying
children through the portal.213 At a congressional hearing on June 30, 2020,
the IRS Commissioner stated that the IRS would issue those payments;
however, he refused to commit to reopening the portal for any non-filer
federal-benefits recipients who had missed the earlier deadlines.214 He
reiterated that these individuals would have to file a 2020 tax return in 2021
to claim the dependent RRC.215 The Commissioner’s testimony prompted
yet another letter from thirteen senators, demanding that the IRS reopen the
portal.216
209. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-76, SSA, RRB Recipients with
Eligible Children Need to Act by Wednesday to Quickly Add Money to Their Automatic
Economic Impact Payment (Apr. 20, 2020).
210. Letter from Sen. Margaret Wood Hassan et al. to Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary,
U.S. Dep’t Treasury, and Andrew Saul, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. 2 (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/A4AX-YD2Z.
211. See Gabrielle Martins Van Jaarsveld, The Effects of COVID-19 Among the Elderly
Population: A Case for Closing the Digital Divide, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY (Nov. 12,
2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2020.577427/full (explaining that
the elderly have been most heavily impacted by the pandemic, in part because they are
unable to utilize digital resources for support).
212. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-68, IRS Urges Taxpayers to Use
Electronic Options; Outlines Online Assistance (May 11, 2020).
213. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-625, COVID-19: OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE FEDERAL RESPONSE AND RECOVERY EFFORTS 220 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-20-625.pdf.
214. See 2020 Filing Season Hearing, supra note 28, at 28–30.
215. Id. at 28–29.
216. Letter from Sen. Benjamin L Cardin et al. to Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S.
Dep’t Treasury, and Charles P. Rettig, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. 2 (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/ZMH8-4MPV.
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On July 22, 2020, in light of the IRS’s actions, advocates filed a
complaint in federal district court, McGruder v. Mnuchin,217 which sought
injunctive and declaratory relief in the form of the IRS allowing non-filer
federal benefits recipients to submit their qualifying child information to
apply for dependent EIPs and the IRS issuing those additional payments on
or before December 31, 2020.218 The IRS, represented by the Department of
Justice, ultimately capitulated just days before a scheduled hearing,
agreeing to open the portal for non-filer federal benefits recipients to enter
their qualifying children.219 By that time, of course, these eligible
individuals had been waiting for four months, during which the pandemic,
and its economic consequences, had ravaged their lives.220
B. TRIS Analysis
The administrative burdens faced by federal benefits recipients are
daunting in the best of times. In the context of a pandemic, when all social
support systems were closed or operating on a remote basis, and when the
recipient was required to navigate an entirely new bureaucracy, the burdens
overwhelmed many taxpayers. The non-filer portal, which recipients were
directed to use, was only available online; there was no paper-based process
by which one could provide their qualifying child information. The portal
was not mobile-responsive, so accessing it through a smart phone or tablet
was extremely problematic. Before April 28, 2020, it was only available in
English; after that date, it was translated into Spanish.221
Had the IRS approached from the outset the challenge of issuing EIPs to
non-filer federal-benefits recipients from a rights-based, administrative
217. Complaint, McGruder v. Mnuchin, No. 2:20-CV-03590 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2020).
One of the authors of this Article, Leslie Book, was co-counsel for the plaintiffs in the
McGruder litigation.
218. See id. at 40.
219. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-180, IRS Takes New Steps to
Ensure People with Children Receive $500 Economic Impact Payments (Aug. 14, 2020);
Order That a Hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction Is Scheduled, McGruder,
No. 2:20-CV-03590 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2020) (scheduling the hearing for August 17, 2020).
220. For a discussion of the effect of the IRS’s actions on the taxpayer who later became
a named plaintiff in the McGruder case, see Michelle Singletary, New Data Reveal How
Many Poor Americans Were Deprived of $500 Stimulus Payment for Their Children, WASH.
POST (June 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/30/new-datareveal-how-many-poor-americans-were-deprived-500-stimulus-payment-their-children/.
221. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-2020-83, Use IRS Non-Filers: Enter
Payment Info Here Tool to Get Economic Impact Payment; Many Low-Income, Homeless
Qualify (Apr. 28, 2020).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss4/3

2022]

REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS

583

burden perspective, it would have identified the challenges this population
faces during a pandemic and designed approaches that accommodated those
challenges. In describing the program under Step 1 of the TRIS analysis
(Description of Program/Proposal), the IRS would have correctly identified
the need to issue EIPs “as rapidly as possible,”222 given the urgency of
addressing the pandemic’s economic impact. Further TRIS analysis,
however, would have demonstrated that goal did not preclude issuing
additional EIPs as updated data became available. For example, under TRIS
Steps 3 (Identification and Analysis of Impacted Population) and 4
(Impacted Segment Analysis), the IRS would have recognized that federal
benefits recipients lacked computer access or did not have social support
systems in place during the pandemic, which would have led to the IRS
identifying them as vulnerable and worthy of particular attention
considering the administrative burdens that might prevent access to their
tax-based pandemic benefits.
Having identified key characteristics of the target population that might
create challenges in fulfilling the purpose of the program, the IRS’s conduct
of the Taxpayer Rights/Administrative Burden Analysis (TRIS Step 5)
likely would have resulted in the IRS issuing the automatic $1,200
payments immediately and then issuing an additional payment for
qualifying children as support systems began to reopen. This approach
would have lessened the learning burden for those beneficiaries who could
navigate the online portal but simply did not learn about it within the fortyhour deadline. The forty-hour deadline was established so the IRS could
have a clear cut-off date by which to issue the automated $1,200
payment.223 There is nothing inherently wrong with establishing such a
deadline, which helps both the IRS and the taxpayer (by distributing the
$1,200 payment quickly). The problem created by the forty-hour deadline
was the failure to accommodate those who could not learn about, access, or
navigate the portal in time. This is the type of excessive administrative
burden that, once identified, should be addressed and mitigated; the TRIS
process provides the mechanism to do so.
Had the IRS signaled to the federal-benefits population and its advocates
that it understood their challenges and had strategies in place (or would
develop them) to address those challenges, it would have eased the

222. See generally I.R.C. § 6428(f)(3)(A).
223. See Singletary, supra note 220 (“The IRS said it rushed the process to ensure the
additional $500 for dependents was included with $1,200 adult payments.”).
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recipients’ psychological burden. As it happened, the IRS’s approach
heightened the already great anxiety, stress, and uncertainty experienced by
this population during the pandemic, depriving them of a cash infusion that
could have helped ease that stress. An administrative burden analysis, such
as that provided for in TRIS Step 5, would have identified stress as a
significant factor in designing a system that allowed for additional
payments. Similarly, recognizing that many such recipients lack computer
access, or are unable to provide the necessary authentication information
required by the portal, the IRS could have devised a paper form for those
recipients. Although such an approach could not have been immediately
implemented, given that the IRS mail processing had completely shut
down, a separate mailbox for these forms could have been established later
in the fall, with a dedicated group of employees charged with processing
these simple forms. Alternatively, the IRS could have explored creating a
phone-based application, since the necessary information was relatively
simple to input.224 As it turned out, the IRS made these additional
payments, but it looked grudging and resentful, rather than helpful and
understanding. It ended up having to process these additional payments in a
time-constrained context rather than planning and implementing them from
the beginning and issuing them in an orderly fashion. By not doing the
latter, it not only imposed excessive administrative burden on non-filer
federal benefits recipients, but also created administrative burden for itself.
Had the IRS conducted even a cursory TRIS analysis, acted on its findings,
and posted the analysis on its website, it would have eased taxpayer
anxiety, delivered additional benefits in an orderly manner, and signaled an
understanding of the taxpayer population that increased trust in the tax
system.
VI. Conclusion
The design and administration of our tax system often fails to reflect
significant burdens that taxpayers experience. The burdens are
consequential and result in a tax system that fails to reflect fundamental
taxpayer rights, especially for low-income and underrepresented taxpayers.
Congress has designed systems for protecting small businesses from
overbearing regulations, for seeking to reduce the burden of paperwork, and
for protecting privacy. As discussed above, these systems do not work
224. To this end, Congress should specifically appropriate funds to assist the IRS when it
tasks the IRS to administer transfer programs in the form of refundable credits.
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perfectly, but they do act to provide a measure of protection for individuals
from a system that might otherwise pay no attention to these specific
problems. These systems seek to protect individuals across government
systems and not to specifically protect taxpayers.
This Article presents a system designed for protecting the interest of
taxpayers to make sure that the administrative processes adopted by the IRS
consider the rights taxpayers have vis-á-vis the tax system. With Congress
increasingly relying on our tax system to deliver benefits, in addition to its
traditional revenue collection function, the failure to account for and reduce
those burdens jeopardizes broader societal goals. By adopting a rightsbased rubric to overlay systems developed by the IRS, Congress can guide
the administrative process to a place better designed to meet the needs of
taxpayers.
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